rights from abuses of power. This is why safeguarding the independence of the judiciary is also a way to guarantee protection of individual human rights. Protecting the independence of the judicial branch from interference by other branches of government, and protecting judges in particular from arbitrary removal or pressure, are thus prerequisites for the effective exercise of the other rights recognized and protected by the Convention. 15 17. The judgment also holds that protection of judicial independence is a cornerstone for the effective exercise of all rights, but it takes on special nuance in the field of elections. The guarantee of judicial independence for judges ruling on electoral matters is intrinsically linked to the continued life of democracy. The judgment holds that the protection of electoral agencies—and thus of the judges serving on them—is significant for democracy, as these courts are integral to the backbone of the electoral system, and it is through this judicial system that disputes over electoral laws are settled. This is why the ability of electoral judges to settle electoral disputes free from interference is one of the components in the full, effective exercise of political rights, including the right to have effective participation in the leadership of public matters, to vote, to be elected, and to have generally equal access to public office. 16 18. The latter point is worth reiterating because the Court held in the judgment that specifically because of its importance for democracy, the mechanism for selecting and removing electoral judges should reflect the principles of a democratic system, and this calls for reinforced protection of these judges’ rights. The statement is based on the standards of judicial independence that were discussed above and also reflects recent observations on threats now facing the democracies of our region. We have seen how efforts have been made in several countries to weaken or appropriate the institutions responsible for organizing elections, or to undermine the independence of judicial bodies specialized in settling disputes on electoral matters. This why the protection of the integrity of boards of elections as a system, and of electoral judges as individuals, is an essential principle for safeguarding the exercise of democracy and the effectiveness of political rights. 17 19. Therefore, and on the basis of these considerations, the judgment correctly concludes that the dismissal of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón by means of Resolution 25-160, adopted by the National Congress outside the bounds of its constitutionally-given powers, is a violation of judicial independence because it did not respect the guarantees set forth in Article 8(1) of the Convention. 20. As the judgment says, the National Congress was empowered by the Constitution to initiate impeachment proceedings against members of the TSE on certain specific grounds also defined in the Constitution. The members of the TSE, however, were dismissed for alleged illegalities in the process by which they were appointed around two years prior to the enactment of Resolution 25-160. The Court therefore concluded that the dismissal of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón was a violation of Article 8(1) of the Convention and, consequently, of the guarantee of stability and irremovability to which he was entitled under the principle of judicial independence. 18 15 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, paras. 65 to 66. 16 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, para. 70. 17 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, para. 71. 18 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, para. 88. 6