104. The Court also finds it pertinent to recall that there are two types of obligations derived from the recognition of ESCER, which are protected by Article 26 of the Convention: those that are immediately enforceable and those of a progressive nature. In relation to the former (immediately enforceable obligations), the Court recalls that the States must adopt effective measures to ensure access, without discrimination, to the benefits recognized by the ESCER, and in general to advance toward their full realization. With regard to the latter (obligations of a progressive nature), progressive realization means that the States Parties have the specific and constant obligation to advance as rapidly and efficiently as possible toward the full realization of those rights, subject to available resources, through legislation or other appropriate means. There is also an obligation of non-retrogression with respect to the realization of the rights achieved. Thus, the conventional obligations of respect and guarantee, as well as the adoption of measures of domestic law (Articles 1(1) and 2), are essential to achieve their effectiveness. 109 105. In consideration of the foregoing, this case does not require an analysis of State conduct related to the progressive development of the ESCER; rather, the Court must determine whether the State guaranteed the protection of such rights to the 65 former employees who were dismissed from the Judiciary as a result of the strike. In other words, the Court must determine whether the State fulfilled its immediately enforceable obligations with respect to the right to work and the right to strike. It is therefore incumbent upon this Court to rule on the State’s conduct with respect to compliance with its obligations to guarantee the right to strike and the right to work and to job security. B.2. The right to strike, in relation to the right to freedom of association and freedom to organize 106. In its advisory role, this Court has already established that the right to strike is one of the fundamental human rights of workers, which may be exercised independently of their organizations. 110 This is specified in Article 45(c) of the OAS Charter (right to strike “by the workers”), and is indicated by the deliberate placement of its wording separately from the rights of trade union associations, in Articles 8(b) of the Protocol of San Salvador and 8(1)(d) of the ICESCR. 111 It is also enshrined in Article 27 of the Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees (“workers have the right to strike”). Otherwise, the negative dimension of freedom of association in its individual aspect could be impaired. It is also a right of trade associations in general. 107. The Court notes that although the right to strike is not expressly recognized in the ILO Conventions, it is significant that Article 3 of Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, to which Guatemala is a party, recognizes the right of workers’ organizations to “organize […] their activities in full freedom and to formulate their program of action.” In that regard, the Committee on Freedom of Association has recognized the importance of the right to strike as “an intrinsic corollary to the right to organize protected by Convention No. 87.” 112 109 Cf. Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 6, 2019. Series C No. 375, para. 190, and Case of the Miskito Divers (Lemoth Morris et al.) v. Honduras, supra, para. 66. Cf. Rights to Freedom to Organize, Collective Bargaining, and Strike, and their Relation to other Rights, with a Gender Perspective. Advisory Opinion OC-27/21 of May 5, 2021. Series A No. 27, para. 95. 110 The positioning of a provision may be a factor of great importance for its interpretation. Cf. Enforceability of the Right to Reply. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 7/86 of August 29, 1986. Series A No. 5, para. 47, and Advisory Opinion OC-27/21, supra, para. 95. 111 112 Cf. Compilation of decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association, Sixth Edition, 2018, para. 754. Cf. Committee on Freedom of Association, Report 344, Case No. 2471, paragraph 891; Report 346, Case No. 2506, 31