- 11 - they were partial and did not overlap. The State considered that the Court’s case law showed that it had permitted the coexistence of the two actions; that, for the purposes of the system, it would be prejudicial if States were unable to carry out the two actions simultaneously, and that the objections filed were of a partial nature, because they referred to facts that were still in dispute, so that they did not affect the acknowledgement. 26. The Court considers that, even though an act of acknowledgement implies, in principle, the acceptance of its jurisdiction,23 in each case it must determine the nature and scope of any objection filed in order to determine its compatibility with the said acknowledgement.24 Consequently, pursuant to the provisions of Article 38(6), together with the provisions of Articles 56(2) and 58, all of its Rules of Procedure, the Court will examine the preliminary objections that have been filed in the understanding that they cannot limit, contradict or annul the content of the acknowledgment of responsibility. A. The Court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear this case owing to an alleged error in the proceedings before the Commission, or to examine facts that are still pending a decision in another case before the Commission 27. In its first objection, the State argued that the Court does not have jurisdiction to examine the facts of case 11,227 of the Patriotic Union (hereinafter “case of the UP” or “case 11,227”), as regards everything that is not directly related in time, means and place with the murder of Senator Cepeda, because case 11,227 is pending a decision by the Commission. In this regard, it argued that the Commission improperly prejudged case 11,227, by establishing in its Report on Merits 62/08 and in the application in the instant case, the existence of a systematic pattern of violence against members of the UP, facts that are disputed in that case. It indicated that this was because, without any grounds established in the Convention or in its Rules of Procedure, the Commission detached this case from case No. 11,277, and continued to examine it based on the Admissibility Report concerning the case of the UP, rather than on a specific report on the instant case that defined the precise facts included in the factual framework of the case of Senator Cepeda, so that there was never any legal certainty concerning the distinction between the cases. The State indicated that it had expressly opposed the inclusion of this pattern of violence, but the Commission did not give it an opportunity to comment on the matter or to contest it; nor did the Commission take into account its arguments in this regard under case 11,227. Consequently, the State argued that the Commission had violated its right to defense and the principles of equality of arms and procedural equality, which merited the Court exercising control of legality owing to the serious error committed by the Commission. The State also believed that the Commission’s action would also prejudice the petitioners and presumed victims in case 11,227, who play no part in the instant case and whose right to the truth and reparation would be reduced owing to any procedural fact established in relation to the Patriotic Union political party in this case. 23 Cf., mutatis mutandi, “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia. Preliminary objections. Judgment of March 7, 2005. Series C No. 122, para. 30. 24 In several cases, the Court has found, explicitly or implicitly, that these procedural actions are compatible. Cf. Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2009. Series C No. 209, paras. 14 and 52 to 63; and Case of González et al. (“Campo Algodonero”) v. Mexico, supra note 15, paras. 20 to 30 and 80.