- 36 - Vargas was executed on August 9, 1994. Subsequently, an attempt was made on the life of Aida Abella with a bazooka, while she was being driven in her car with her escort, although she was not injured in the attack.132 Hernán Motta Motta, who took the place of Mr. Cepeda Vargas as a senator had to go into exile owing to the threats he received, because “he was fourth on the list” of the “coup de grâce plan,” so that, following the death of Mr. Chacón Peña and Mr. Cepeda Vargas and the attempt on the life of Aida Abella (in May 1996), he was in great danger.133 99. According to the information provided by the State as helpful evidence, particularly in relation to some of the measures taken by the office of the Prosecutor General of the Nation, it was not until 2009 that the investigation appears to have connected the murder of Senator Cepeda to the existence of the said plan, without having achieved any specific results to date.134 Considering that the State has acknowledged the delay in the investigations (supra para. 13 and infra para. 127), and that these investigations were not congruent with the complex nature of the facts (infra paras. 118 to 122), the Court appreciates that investigations continue into the existence of this plan, but finds that the belated actions taken in this regard reveal that the authorities did not exercise due diligence to clarify the threats and thus prevent the violation of the right to life of Senator Cepeda Vargas. 100. However, it is relevant that numerous express requests to protect Senator Cepeda Vargas were made to diverse State authorities, including senior officials of the Executive. It is clear to the Court that the authorities abstained from protecting him without any justification, and that the limited measures adopted were evidently insufficient in a context of violence against members and leaders of the UP, which imposed on the State a special obligation of prevention and protection. 101. Regardless of the existence of a plan specifically named “coup de grâce,” the Court finds that an organized structure existed that decided, planned and carried out the execution of Senator Cepeda Vargas. The State itself acknowledged that the delay in the investigations prevented identification of “the masterminds of the execution and the underlying organized criminal structures that promoted it” (infra para. 127). The State’s obligation of due diligence meant that the investigation into the threats against Senator Cepeda and other members of the UP should also have been addressed at determining the existence of this or another plan, given the context in which the 132 Cf. testimony of October 10, 2007, rendered by Aida Abella before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (evidence file, tome XVIII, attachment 56 to the brief in answer to the application, folios 8052 to 8055). 133 Cf. testimony provided by Hernán Motta Motta at the public hearing held before the Inter-American Court on January 26, 2010. Similarly, testimony provided by Jaime Caicedo Turriego at the public hearing held before the Inter-American Court on January 26, 2010, and testimony provided by Aida Abella before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on October 10, 2007, supra note 132, folios 8052 to 8055. 134 Cf. Office of the Prosecutor General of the Nation, the 26th Special Prosecutor of the National Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Unit, Investigation No. 329, executive report of January 12, 2010 (evidence file, tome XXI, helpful evidence presented by the State, folios 8796 to 8805), and note No. 051 of the 26th Special Prosecutor of the National Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Unit, addressed to the International Affairs Office of the office of the Prosecutor General of the Nation, of February 12, 2010 (evidence file, tome XXI, helpful evidence presented by the State, folios 8817 to 8818). As of that year and up until February 2010, the Prosecutor advised that other investigations were reviewed to try and find elements relating to the said plan and statements were required, particularly from Fernando Brito Ruiz, former DAS Director; retired General Harold Bedoya Pizarro, and Octavio Vargas Silva, Director General of the National Police at the time of the facts, who stated that they were unaware of or did not recall the situation. Furthermore, a statement was obtained from Rafael Pardo Rueda, Minister of Defense at the time of the facts, who advised that he recalled the complaints and stated that he had “requested the High Command and the DAS to conduct the respective investigations.” In addition, the statements of Jaime Caicedo Turriego and Aidee Moreno Ibagué were incorporated, and the testimony of Aida Abella was required.