the authority and effectiveness of the final ruling. It also set forth that the breach of provisional measures may constitute a violation of Article 34 of the European Convention, which enshrines the right of individual complaint.7 8. It can be concluded from the above that the European Court no longer characterizes provisional measures as an institution that stems —or should stem— from a provision expressly provided for in a convention, and it now considers it to come from the actual protection object of the treaty. II. 9. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and its competence to order provisional measures. In Article 63(2) of the Convention it sets forth that: [i]n cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission. 10. In turn, Article 27 of the existing Rules of Procedure of the Court states: 1. At any stage of the proceedings involving cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court may, on its own motion, order such provisional measures as it deems appropriate, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Convention. 2. With respect to matters not yet submitted to it, the Court may act at the request of the Commission. 3. In contentious cases before the Court, victims or alleged victims, or their representatives, may submit to it to a request for provisional measures, which must be related to the subject of the case. […] 11. The Inter-American Court has the express power to order provisional measures. Considering this competence, the consistent interpretation that the Court has made of such provisions has been based on methods of interpretation of international law that are derived from Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter "Vienna Convention"), among other principles. 12. The Vienna Convention states in Article 31(1) that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Repeatedly, the Court has stated that the interpretation of the "ordinary meaning of the terms" of the treaty can not in itself be a norm, but rather it must be considered within the context and, particularly, within its 7 Mamatkulov and Askarov. v. Turkey, supra note 2 , para. 128. 3