3 being threatened.2 The Court's jurisdiction is however conditioned upon the existence of a serious and urgent situation posing a risk of irreparable harm to the rights of persons. 5. That, pursuant to its jurisdiction, within the framework of provisional measures the Court must only consider arguments dealing exclusively and directly with the extreme seriousness, urgency and need for preventing irreparable harm to persons.3 Thus, in order to decide whether or not to maintain the provisional measures in force, the Tribunal must analyze if the extremely serious and urgent situation giving rise to the measures adopted persists, or if new, equally serious and urgent circumstances warrant maintaining the measures. Any other issue may only be brought to the Court’s attention under the procedure for contentious cases. 6. That in its Order of June 18, 2002, the Court held that “the facts stated by the Commission in its request for provisional measures, […] evidence prima facie, an extremely serious and urgent situation affecting the inmates’ rights to life and humane treatment”, and thus ordered the immediate protection of the life and physical safety of the prisoners. The events which have taken place at the Urso Branco Prison since the last Order issued in this matter on September 21, 2005 warrant the examination of the current situation in the prison and the issuance of this Order. 7. That, with regard to the measures adopted to protect the life and physical safety of the beneficiaries, the State has reported a number of actions taken with a view towards increased security at the prison, such as hiring prison guards and reducing the number of inmates. The state also pointed out that those cells which had formerly been inter-connected have been repaired, which ended the serious problem of aggressions among prisoners. As regards the reports of torture and mistreatment allegedly committed by the prison guards, the State pointed out that the management of the Urso Branco Prison has a policy to suppress all violence in the prison, consisting of providing continuous training to prison guards and limiting sanctions to the inmates, when necessary, only to the prohibition to receive visits. 8. That the representatives stated that, until 2006, the Urso Branco Prison had been beyond the control of the State authorities. At the time, prisoners were under no surveillance; prison guards would not enter a number of cellblocks; there were tunnels and connections linking the cells, allowing the leaders of groups of inmates to circulate freely around the prison. These leaders, who were in control of various cellblocks, would order the execution of other prisoners considered to be rivals and jeopardized the physical integrity and the life of other inmates. According to the representatives, in late 2006 the State would have switched from its policy of neglecting the prisoners to a new repressive stance using torture to gain control of the prison. In approximately six months, four managers were removed from office amidst accusations of committing or Cf. Matter of Luisiana Rìos et al. Provisional Measures regarding Venezuela. Order of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights of September 12, 2005, operative paragraphs N. 1 and 2. 2 Cf. Matter of James et al. Provisional Measures regarding Trinidad and Tobago. Order of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights of August 29, 1998, Considering clause N. 6; Matter of Capital El Rodeo I & El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, supra note 1, Considering clause N. 10; and Matter of “Globovisión” Television Station. Provisional Measures regarding Venezuela. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 21, 2007, Considering clause N. 14. 3