considering the attitude of the petitioner, would mean that the State’s international responsibility for the violation of an obligation established by the Convention would be engaged from the time at which one of its organs committed an internationally wrongful act, even though it had not had the opportunity to redress this internationally wrongful act. Now, whether this or any other thesis is followed, in the practice, the ultimate intention of the said rule is to enable the State to establish, as soon as possible, the effective exercise of, and respect for, the human rights that have been violated. This is the object and purpose of the Convention15 and, consequently, should happen as soon as practicable in everyone’s interests, making the intervention of the inter-American jurisdiction unnecessary.16 This means that, in situations in which it has been argued in the respective sphere of the domestic jurisdiction that the State has not complied with its undertakings as regards respecting and ensuring the free and full exercise of human rights, it is possible to claim the intervention of the international jurisdictional body and not before, so that, if admissible, the State is ordered to comply with the international obligations it has violated, to guarantee that it will not violate them again, and to make reparation for all the consequences of such violations.17 Therefore, this rule is also a mechanism to encourage the State to comply with its human rights obligations without waiting for the inter-American system to order it to do so as a result of litigation. Thus, its practical effect is that the State re-establish respect for human rights as soon as possible and, to that end, it could be said that this rule has been established also and, above all, to benefit the victim of human rights violations.18 Based on the above, it can be concluded that this rule has been established in the Convention as an essential component of the whole inter-American system for the promotion and protection of human rights, by stressing that, as indicated in the second paragraph of its Preamble, the “international protection […] reinforc[es] or complement[s] the protection provided by the domestic law of the American States.”19 15 Art. 1(1) of the Convention: “[t]he States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.” 16 Art. 33 of the Convention: “[t]he following organs shall have competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the commitments made by the States Parties to this Convention: (a) the Inter-American Commission de Human rights, referred to as the Commission, and (b) the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, referred to as the Court”. 17 Art. 63(1) of the Convention: “[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party”. 18 Hereinafter “the victim.” 19 Segundo paragraph of the Preamble of the Convention: “[r]ecognizing that the essential rights of man are not derived from one's being a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human personality, and that they therefore justify international protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the American States.” Perhaps it is Article 25(1) of the Convention that best expresses the subsidiary nature of the inter-American human rights system, when it indicates that: “[e]veryone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental 5