the presumption of innocence. 190 The Court has indicated in other cases that the deprivation of liberty of a person who has been accused or indicted for an offense cannot be based on general preventive or special preventive purposes that could be attributed to the punishment. 191 Therefore, it has emphasized that pretrial detention, being the most severe measure, should be applied exceptionally and that the rule must be the defendant’s liberty while a decision is made regarding his criminal responsibility. 192 158. In view of the above, the judicial authority can only impose measures of this nature when it is shown that: a) the purpose of the measures that deprive or restrict liberty is compatible with the Convention; b) that the measures adopted are appropriate to achieve the stated objective; c) that they are necessary; in other words, that they are absolutely essential to achieve the desired purpose and that, among all possible measures, there is no less burdensome one in relation to the right involved that would be as suitable to achieve the proposed objective, and d) that they are strictly proportionate, so that the sacrifice inherent in the restriction of the right to personal liberty is not exaggerated or excessive compared with the advantages obtained by such restriction and the achievement of the purpose sought. 193 159. Regarding the first point, the Court has indicated that this measure should be imposed only when it is necessary to satisfy a legitimate purpose, namely, to ensure that the accused does not hinder the development of the proceedings or evade justice. 194 It has also emphasized that risks to the proceedings should not be presumed, but must be verified in each case, based on real and objective circumstances relating to the specific case. 195 The requirement of such purposes is based on Articles 7(3), 7(5) and 8(2) of the Convention. In this regard, it should be recalled that the United Nations Human Rights Committee has indicated that pretrial detention cannot be mandatory for every type of crime, but must be analyzed according to the circumstances of each case and that it must be determined on a case-by-case basis when the measure is reasonable and necessary. 196 160. With regard to necessity, the Court finds that, since deprivation of liberty is a measure that implies the restriction of the individual’s freedom of action, the judicial authority must be required to impose such a measure only when it considers that the other mechanisms provided by law, Cf. Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 106; Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, supra, para. 97, and Case of Tzompaxtle Tecpile v. Mexico, supra, para. 104. 190 191 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 103; Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 97, and Case of Tzompaxtle Tecpile v. Mexico, supra, para. 104. 192 Cf. Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras, supra, para. 67; Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206, para. 121; Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, supra, para. 97, and Case of Tzompaxtle Tecpile v. Mexico, supra, para. 104. 193 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 93; Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 356; Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, supra, para. 98, and Case of Tzompaxtle Tecpile v. Mexico, supra, para. 105. 194 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77; and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 357; Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, supra, para. 99, and Case of Tzompaxtle Tecpile v. Mexico, supra, para. 106. 195 Cf. Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 357; Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, supra, para. 99, and Case of Tzompaxtle Tecpile v. Mexico, supra, para. 106. 196 Cf. United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, Liberty and Security of Person, CCPR/C/GC/35 (2014), para. 38. -42-