1. Can the heirs of the 16 victims of the violation of the right to life have recourse to the compensation mechanism established in paragraph 337 of the Judgment? 2. Can the victims of the violation of the right to property have recourse to the compensation mechanism established in paragraph 337? 3. Can the 27 victims of forced displacement recognized in paragraph 268 of the Judgment have recourse to the compensation mechanism established in paragraph 337 of the Judgment for this concept? 4. Can the victims of forced displacement file an administrative action against the State for the facts of forced displacement, or can they have recourse to Law 288 of 1996? 5. Does the Judgment enable the next of kin of Luis Enrique Parada Ropero – who have not been compensated – to have recourse to the mechanism under Law 288 of 1996 or to the mechanism that the Court refers to in paragraph 337 of the Judgment? 6. Does the Judgment enable the 18 persons who were not recognized as injured party, whose mandate was accredited by the representatives and who were not included in the Commission’s Merits Report, to have recourse to the mechanism established by Law 288 of 1996 or to the mechanism referred to by the Court in paragraph 337 of the Judgment? 7. If there are other family members of victims of the violation of the right to life, who did not have recourse to the contentious administrative jurisdiction, and who were not represented at the inter-American level, can they have recourse to the mechanism established by Law 288 of 1996 or to the mechanism referred to by the Court in paragraph 337 of the Judgment? A. First question: Can the heirs of the 16 victims of the violation of the right to life have recourse to the compensation mechanism established in paragraph 337 of the Judgment? Arguments of the representatives and observations of the Commission and the State 14. The representatives indicated that, in paragraph 337 of the Judgment, which established a domestic mechanism so that certain victims could receive the corresponding reparations, the Court had failed to mention two groups of victims recognized as injured party: (i) the “direct” victims, who had not been considered beneficiaries of reparations under domestic law, and (ii) the victims of the violation of the right to property. Thus, they indicated that, even though the Court had declared 17 persons (16 of them represented by the representatives) to be victims of the violation of the right to life, it had “not attributed any legal consequence to this fact, contrary to its reiterated case law according to which the victims themselves have a right to compensation”; in other words, it did not indicate the reparation that was due to these 16 persons “recognized as direct victims of the violation of Article 4.” Consequently, they asked the Court to clarify whether the heirs of these 16 victims can have recourse to the mechanism established in paragraph 337 of the Judgment. 15. The Commission observed, in relation to the scope of the reparations derived from the violation of the right to life, that “[i]n the consistent case law of the Inter-American Court, it has been understood that violations of the right to life give rise to pecuniary reparations both with regard to the person deceased, as a direct victim, and with regard to the next of kin, as victims because of the effects on their mental and moral integrity due to 4