the case. An example of this is the non-pecuniary damage suffered directly by the person who died, and the amount of the reparation for this is received by his or her heirs. However, this Court has considered that, if national mechanisms to determine forms of reparation exist, such procedures and results may be assessed and that, if these mechanisms do not meet criteria of objectivity, reasonableness and effectiveness to make adequate reparation for the violations of the rights recognized in the Convention, the Court may, in exercise of its subsidiary and complementary competence, establish pertinent measures of reparation. 11 This is a matter that must be deliberated and decided in each case during the merits and reparations stages, based on the corresponding arguments of the parties. 22. Consequently, it is not for the Court to re-assess, by means of interpretation of judgment, the suitability of the domestic mechanisms to establish adequate reparation for the violations of the rights that were declared, particularly if the matter was not clearly explained by the representatives or, if applicable, by the Commission at the appropriate procedural opportunities during the merits and reparations stages. Accordingly, in answer to the question posed by the representatives, the heirs of the 16 victims who died cannot be considered within the mechanism established in paragraph 337 of the Judgment. 23. Consequently, the Court finds that accepting the interpretation suggested by the representatives would suppose the modification or expansion of the decision taken in the Judgment, and this is not possible pursuant to Articles 67 of the American Convention and 31(3) and 68 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure. Therefore, this aspect of the request for interpretation is inadmissible. B. Second question: Can the victims of the violation of the right to property have recourse to the compensation mechanism established in paragraph 337 of the Judgment? Arguments of the representatives and observations of the Commission and the State 24. In relation to the preceding question (supra para. 14), the representatives indicated that the five victims12 of damage to the right to property did not receive compensation at the domestic level and that some of them had not received compensation under any other heading.13 This is why they asked the Court to clarify whether these five victims could have recourse to the compensation mechanism established in paragraph 337 of the Judgment. 25. The Commission indicated that the Court’s considerations on the pecuniary and nonpecuniary damage “appear to circumscribe its analysis to the victims, and the next of kin of the victims, of the violation of the rights to life and to personal integrity, without making explicit reference to the compensation for pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage to which some of these same persons would be beneficiaries, but as victims of other violations declared in the Judgment, such as the rights to property, or to freedom of movement and residence arising from the displacement.” Thus, considering that the determination of the 11 Cf. Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213, para. 246. Similarly, see Case of the Massacre of Santo Domingo v. Colombia, para. 337. 12 Namely: Mario Galvis, Víctor Palomino, Margarita Tilano, María Cenobia Panqueva and Olimpo Cárdenas, Case of the Massacre of Santo Domingo v. Colombia, para. 282. 13 Namely: Víctor Palomino and María Cenobia Panqueva. 7