61 judgment, without proceedings, and without an indictment sustaining the arrest warrant;” c) In the case of Urcesino Ramírez-Rojas the National Chamber for Terrorism (Sala Nacional de Terrorismo), “on May 13, 2003, that is, one month and sixteen days after the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) had declared the nullity of the oral proceedings and of the prosecutor’s case against him, declared again the oral proceedings and the prosecutor’s case to be null. However, the proceedings were restarted […] on July 24 2003, […] that is, two months and twelve days after declaring the oral proceedings and the prosecutor’s case to be null. During the term between March 27, and May 10, 2003, [Urcesino RamírezRojas] remained in custody without a condemnatory judgment, without an indictment, but with a preventive arrest warrant from August 9, 1991;” d) It is not admissible that people who were prosecuted by the State in violation of due process of law, as in the case of the alleged victims, and whose trial or oral proceedings were declared to be null, should remain per se deprived of their freedom based only on the application of provisions which do not take into account that they have recovered their quality of defendants, and which disregard the time during which they have already remained deprived of their freedom; and e) The State of Peru has violated the right to judicial protection as set forth by the American Convention to the detriment of the alleged victims “by reason of the restrictions to access to justice of fact and of law, in the domestic jurisdiction, for the protection and restitution of their violated rights.” Arguments of the State 100. With respect to the alleged violation of Article 7 of the Convention, the State pointed out that: a) “Reasonable terms have been respected in the case of Ramírez-Rojas, and the case of García-Asto has already concluded;” b) The deprivation of the alleged victims’ freedom “does not correspond to only one proceeding of provisional detention, but also to the new proceedings being conducted as the previous ones were annulled;” c) “The transition from one proceeding to another does not necessarily have to result in the automatic release of the petitioners, as it corresponds to the ordinary judges to define the legal situation in their capacity as defendants in that transition, considering that their preventive detention has been ordered by virtue of the requirements of Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1991;” d) In the new respective trials, it is not denied to the victims “that within the context of their right to defense they may request the respective change of the arrest measure;” e) The annulment of a trial does not necessarily have to result in the automatic release of the defendant;