21 2. Mario Pablo Rodríguez-Hurtado, attorney-at-law From 1981 to May 5, 1992, the anti-terrorist legislation included, but was limited to, Legislative Decree No. 46 of 1981, and Articles 319 through 324 of Criminal Code of 1991. Legislative Decree No. 46 revealed “infringements to nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia.” In turn, the militarization of country was deepened by Law No. 24.150 of 1985. not the the the In the following years, Laws Nos. 24.651, 24.700, 24.953, and 25.301 reformed certain issues concerning the penalty established for the crime of terrorism as described by the Criminal Code of 1924, including those relating to the agency entrusted with conducting investigations, the possibility of holding detainees incommunicado, and the applicable penalties. The Criminal Code of 1991, in spite of its “democratic criminal dogmatics,” does not depart from the emergency criminal legislation regarding terrorism. Furthermore, it keeps the ample scope of its definitions for acts of collaboration and restricts procedural and penal system benefits in cases of illicit drug trafficking and terrorism. In April 1992, the then President Fujimori launched a coup d’état and sought “to pacify the country within a legal framework which would guara[ntee] the application of stiff punishment to terrorists.” In such circumstances, two DecreeLaws were passed: Decree-Law No. 25.475 of May 1992, which established the penalties for the crimes of terrorism and the procedures to be adopted regarding the investigation, prosecution, and trial thereof, and which is in force as of the date hereof; and Decree-Law No. 25.659 of August 1992, which established the crime of high treason, describing it as a crime of terrorism. Decree-Law No. 25.475 “infringes the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia principle, as it does not comply with the requirement of restriction and certainty,” without which it is not possible to ensure to citizens that they will not be prosecuted or convicted for an ill-defined or imprecise conduct. Article 2 of said Decree-Law defines the crime of terrorism, describing it rather vaguely; establishes many punishable conducts without attributing any type of quality or scale thereto; and makes reference to the commission of acts against various protected legal interests. Furthermore, the description of the means with which the act is committed is also vague, and so is the description of its consequences. The same criticism can be made with relation to Article 4 of Decree-Law No. 25.475, which describes the crime of collaboration with terrorism with an even broader “vagueness” than the rule until then in force. The term of imprisonment is the same for both perpetrators and aiders and abettors. In turn, Decree-Law No. 25.475 did not guarantee due process of law, as it delegated the criminal investigation to the police, and restricted the participation of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. In addition, said decree “restricts the participation of the defense counsel, bars release during the preliminary investigation proceedings except for unconditional release, and does not allow police officers who took part in the police investigation to give testimony as witnesses.”