4 that the relief sought by the petitioner conformed to due process protections and that the fact that the rulings did not favor the petitioner does not constitute a violation of the American Convention. 19. It contends that the “action to vacate an administrative act and restore the right” has been proven to be a suitable to request reinstatement in situations that were virtually the same as the petitioner’s; nonetheless, her complaint was filed eight months after notification of the ruling, twice as long as the fourmonth period of time permitted by law. 20. As for the tutela actions, it argues that this was not the proper mechanism for the protection of the petitioner’s rights, since such appeals are of a special and subsidiary nature. Moreover, it notes that there are effective mechanisms in place within the State to restore the rights of the petitioner, which were allegedly infringed: firstly, the administrative procedure, to seek to get the resolution vacated and, consequently, restore the right; and secondly, the labor procedure, to seek to protect the right of freedom of association in union matters. 21. As to the labor proceedings pertaining to immunity of union officers, the State contends that all rights were respected throughout this proceeding. It also argues that there was no violation of the reasonable time period pursuant to the standards of the Inter-American system, even though the Court failed to rule on the appeal within the statutory time period, because of the high number of matters that it has to process. It claims that the finding of the labor court judge was that, because, at the time of the removal from office of the petitioner, she did not have immunity of union officers against dismissal or transfer. It notes that even though legal remedies available in the State were exhausted with the ruling of the appeals court on the labor matter, if the petitioner considers that this was the case of an arbitrary and unlawful procedure, she still has tutela relief available to her. 22. The State contends that even though the petitioner listed several international instruments for the protection of women’s rights, she has not cited concrete violations stemming from her condition as a women; however, it argues that the IACHR would only be competent to hear cases of alleged violations of Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. Lastly, it affirmed that the facts stated in the petition do not tend to establish the violation of rights protected in the Convention and requested that it be found inadmissible pursuant to Article 47.b. of the aforementioned instrument. IV. ANALYSIS OF COMPETENCE AND ADMISSIBILITY A. Competence 23. The petitioner has standing, in principle, under Article 44 of the American Convention, to file petitions before the Commission. The petition identifies as alleged victims individuals, for whom the State of Colombia committed to respect and ensure the rights enshrined in the American Declaration. As to the State, the Commission notes that Colombia has been a State party to the American Convention since July 31, 1973, when it deposited the instrument of ratification and, therefore, the Commission is competent ratione personae to entertain the petition. 24. Additionally, the Commission is competent ratione loci to examine the petition, inasmuch as violations of rights protected in the American Convention are alleged to have taken place within the territory of Colombia, a State party to said convention. The Commission is competent ratione temporis, being that the obligation to respect and ensure the rights protected in the American Convention was already in effect for the State on the date when the facts alleged in the petition presumably occurred. Lastly, the Commission is competent ratione materiae, because the petition charges potential violations of human rights protected by the American Convention, as well as international instruments for the protection of women cited by the petitioner; the IACHR is competent to rule on alleged violations of Article 7 of the InterAmerican Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará), as Colombia has been a party to this instrument since November 15, 1996. B. Admissibility requirements