11 useful when they provide additional information about the consequences of the alleged violations.14 23. The State also objected to the testimony rendered by David Ernesto Morales Cruz (supra para. 16(b)) in his affidavit before a notary public. The State claimed that “his judgments should not have been subjective […].” Likewise, the State objected to the testimony rendered by José Benjamín Cuéllar Martínez (supra para. 16(j)), on the grounds that he had been present during the public hearing. According to the State, his presence led to inequality among the witnesses, and his testimony is subjective. The Court notes that Mr. Cuéllar Martínez was in fact present at the public hearing held on January 25 and 26 of 2007 and that upon the Court’s request of January 22, 2007 he submitted an affidavit. On this issue, the Court will take into account the State’s observations and evaluate the testimony applying the rules of competent analysis, since the Court finds that this testimony may contribute to the Tribunal’s determination of the facts of the present case, to the extent that they conform to the object of testimony defined in the Order of the President of December 14, 2006 (supra para. 12) and the Secretariat’s communication of January 22, 2007. 24. The common intervener objected to the testimony rendered by Oscar Antonio Castro Ramírez (supra para. 16(k)) in his affidavit before a notary public, and requested that the Court evaluate his testimony in accordance with the rules of competent analysis and experience. They further requested that the Court apply Article 52 of the Rules of the Court, which relates to false evidence. In this regard, the Court admits this testimony to the extent that it conforms to the object of testimony established in the Order of the President of December 14, 2006 (supra para. 12), and will evaluate the testimony in light of the common intervener’s observations, the body of evidence in this case, and the rules of competent analysis. 25. With respect to the expert testimony rendered by Mauricio José Ramón Gaborit Pino (supra para. 16(i)) in his affidavit before a notary public, the State objected because he “works as Head of the Department of Psychology of [the Central American University José Simeón Cañas]. [IDHUCA] also belongs to this institution, and represents the alleged victims in the present case. As a result, the State does not consider him credible as an expert witness due to his direct and evident relationship with the representatives of the alleged victims.” The State requested that the Court seek the objective and professional psychological opinion of a different expert witness. On this issue, the Court notes that this objection was already addressed in the Order of the President of December 14, 2006 in the “whereas” clauses eleven and twelve. Likewise, the State objected to the expert testimony rendered by Ricardo Alberto Iglesias Herrera (supra para. 16(h)), stating that his testimony “does not constitute a ‘technical expert report’, but rather, a criminal complaint, affirming facts and situations without any base in evidence, and expressing a ‘subjective’ evaluation of the historical situation of El Salvador […].” Moreover, the State indicated that “in his expert report he narrates frightening and supra note 10, para. 44; Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. supra note 10, para. 40; and Case Escué Zapata, supra note 10, para. 29. 14 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et. al.) v. Guatemala, supra note 13, para. 70; Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 22, 2006. Series C No. 153, para. 59; Case of Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2006. Series C No. 149, para. 56; and Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Objection, Mertis, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006. Series C No. 148, para. 121.