those indicating that the detentions of Messrs. Fernández Prieto and Tumbeiro took place in a general context in Argentina of detentions carried out without a court order or grounds for flagrante delicto. Moreover, in its brief with final arguments of June 18, 2020, the State acknowledged that this “case is emblematic of what, during the 1990s, our country knew of as the ‘policing intuition’ (olfato policial), which involved unchecked police actions, encouraged by public security policies based on discretional preventive operations, without any prior investigation or intelligence that were, therefore, profoundly inefficient.” The State also indicated that “this type of police practice was promoted by security policies that were defined under the paradigm of the so-called “war on drugs” and were also protected by inadequate or inexistent judicial control.”24 27. In this regard, in the Case of Bulacio v. Argentina, the Court noted that in Argentina, in 1991, “indiscriminate police detentions were carried out.”25 In that case, the Court observed that, from 1991 to 2003, the crime control policy in the city of Buenos Aires “implemented intervention techniques” aimed at crime prevention that “included police presence and surveillance in public spaces and police detention of individuals without a court order.”26 In the same case, the Court noted the following: In the case of detentions for identification purposes, the police, generally and belatedly, submit to the judge a list of persons detained stating as causes for detention: “loitering,” “wandering aimlessly,” “window watching” […]. The judges conduct an “quasiadministrative” control of police detentions […]; therefore, it is utterly impossible to control roughly 100,000 to 150,000 detentions every month in the city of Buenos Aires effectively. […] The police arrest large numbers of individuals together or separately and it is only at the police station that they are “classified” as adults, youths, women, men. These mass detentions take place under the a priori consideration that there are certain individuals who, according to the social defense program, per se may commit crimes.27 28. In this regard, since 1995, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (hereinafter also, “the UN Committee”) has urged Argentina to take all necessary measures to prevent cases of arbitrary detention.28 Also, in a report on a visit to Argentina in 2003, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (hereinafter also, “the Working Group”) referred to the general situation of the rule of law in that country following the return to democracy in 198329 and indicated that, “in some provinces, such as Buenos Aires […], police officers haves the authority to arrest or apprehend individuals who they believe are intending to commit an offence,” and “may make arrests on the grounds of public order or security and for the purposes of identity and background checks.” The Working Group indicated that it had been advised by non-governmental organisations “that police officers tended to abuse this power of detention” and indicated that in “practice, many individuals are arrested simply for loitering, or because they cannot give a good reason for being in a particular place or because they have no money in their pockets.” “According to the representatives of various social 24 Argentina’s brief with final arguments dated June 18, 2020 (merits file, folio 832). Case of Bulacio v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 18, 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 69. 25 26 Cf. Case of Bulacio v. Argentina, supra, para. 53. 27 Cf. Case of Bulacio v. Argentina, supra, para. 56. 28 UN, Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on Argentina, April 5, 1995, para. 161. UN, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report on visit to Argentina, E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.3, December 23, 2003, para. 11. 29 10