travelling “was being driven in a suspicious way.” Regarding the legal characterization, the judge indicated that criminal intent had been constituted because, owing to the amount seized, it was clear that “Fernández Prieto was transporting drugs for a purpose other than mere possession.” Regarding the inconsistency as regards the place where the seized substance had been found, the judge indicated that this did not alter “the confession” made by Mr. Fernández Prieto. In order to reach his decision, the judge stated that he had taken into account the statements of the police officers and the expert appraisal of the nature of the seized substance, “granting special importance to the express acknowledgement that [Mr. Fernández Prieto had] made in his initial statement.”48 40. On September 16, 1996, Mr. Fernández Prieto filed an appeal against the said judgment. In his appeal he argued that the federal judge had made an “inappropriate legal characterization of the conduct” by considering that “the search without a court order of the vehicle in which [Mr. Fernández Prieto] was travelling was not null and void.” The grievances alleged were based on two arguments: (a) the arbitrary nature of the search without a court order, and (b) the erroneous legal characterization. 49 41. On November 26, 1996, the Federal Court of Appeal of Mar del Plata (hereinafter also “the Federal Chamber”) dismissed the appeal, confirming the sentence. The Chamber considered that “a reading of the proceedings necessarily leads to the conclusion that the search conducted […] originated from a prior suspicious situation noted by the police officers, in circumstances in which it was impossible to request a prior court order,” and that this “was carried out without violating any individual guarantee or right.” The Federal Chamber also indicated that, if it accepted the defense’s arguments, this would impede “the work of crime prevention” by the “police authority” by restricting their ability to “revise a vehicle in “suspicious circumstances,” and it added that the specific case was merely a “prudent action by the police exercising their specific functions and without any violation of either constitutional or procedural rules.”50 42. On December 12, 1996, Mr. Fernández Prieto filed a federal special appeal against this judgment.51 On February 14, 1997, the Federal Chamber rejected this appeal considering it inadmissible. In its reasoning, the Federal Chamber explained that, in this case, “no matter with serious institutional implications was observed that […] would allow for the appeal” and that the contested judgment was not the result of a “reasoned derivation from the law in force”52 and it had not entailed a violation of constitutional guarantees. 43. On February 28, 1997, Mr. Fernández Prieto filed a remedy of complaint against the said decision. In this remedy, his defense argued the violation of due process as a result of the “notable absence of impartiality in the case” and affirmed its admissibility considering that the matter under discussion did “meet the requirements of serious institutional implications” because it affected “fundamental principles of a social nature,” especially if “the number of cases similar” to that of Mr. Fernández Prieto was considered. His defense concluded that “the 48 Judgment of the Federal Court of Mar del Plata of July 19, 1996 (evidence file, folios 169 to 196). Appeal filed by Carlos Alberto Fernández Prieto against the judgment convicting him (evidence file, folios 198 to 204). 49 Cf. Judgment of the Federal Appeals Chamber of Mar del Plata of November 26, 1996 (evidence file, folios 206 to 214). 50 Special federal appeal filed by Carlos Alberto Fernández Prieto on December 12, 1996 (evidence file, folios 215 to 229). 51 52 232). Decision of the Federal Appeals Chamber of Mar del Plata of February 14, 1997 (evidence file, folios 230 to 14