circumstances […] that justified the procedure.”113 The Court notes that the criminal court did not describe the objective circumstances that justified the detention for identification purposes, or discuss why they constituted a situation of flagrante delicto, or how the presumed nervousness of Mr. Tumbeiro objectively revealed that he was committing an offense. 85. The Court recalls that Mr. Tumbeiro filed a cassation appeal against the judgment of August 26, 1998, in which he requested the annulment of the police procedure in the understanding that “a sufficient level of suspicion” did not exist to proceed to the detention and search without a court order.114 The Court observes that, although the Criminal Cassation Chamber carried out an adequate control of conventionality, acquitting Mr. Tumbeiro because “there were no duly justified circumstances that would lead to the presumption that someone had committed a criminal offense,”115 owing to a special remedy filed by the Prosecutor General, the Supreme Court of Justice, as the highest instance, revoked the acquittal and confirmed the first-degree conviction in a judgment of October 3, 2002. In its judgment, the Supreme Court determined the following: […] That, in these circumstances, the conclusions reached by the a quo are inadmissible because no irregularity can be noted in the procedure from which any violation of due process of law can be inferred. Moreover, the contested ruling not only disregards the legitimacy of the crime prevention actions taken within the framework of prudent and reasonable action by police personnel in the exercise of their specific functions, but also fails to assess, together with the nervousness demonstrated by the accused, the other circumstances based on which the police personnel decided to identity him […].116 86. The Court considers that none of the circumstances indicated by the officers of the Argentine Federal Police that were used to justify the detention for identification purposes, and that were subsequently analyzed by the courts at the different stages of the proceedings, could be comprehended as flagrante delicto or the “strong or prima facie indications of guilt” described in the Criminal Procedural Code, or the “duly justified circumstances leading to the presumption that someone may have committed or could commit a criminal offense or misdemeanor and fails to prove his identity conclusively” referred to in Law 23,950 in order to detain a person for identification purposes. To the contrary, the Court considers that this was a detention based on the prejudices of the police, subsequently validated by the domestic courts owing to the objectives sought and the evidence obtained. On this point, the Court notes the opinion of expert witness Sofía Tiscornia that: [T]he reasons for detentions given by law enforcement personnel relate to a limited series of bureaucratic formulas that are far from identifying the diversity and specificity of the circumstances of the detentions. Moreover, “the use of clichés such as ‘nervous gestures,’ ‘quickening his steps,’ ‘avoiding police scrutiny,’ ‘loitering in the area,’ ‘rapidly moving away,’ or ‘standing on a corner,’ just to give a few examples, demonstrates the imprecision of the reasons cited.117 87. The foregoing allows the Court to conclude that the detention of Mr. Tumbeiro did not comply with the requirement of legality and, therefore, constituted a violation of Article 7(1) Judgment of Federal Oral Criminal Court No. 1 of the Federal Capital of August 26, 1998 (evidence file, folios 1537 to 1576). 113 114 Special appeal of March 30, 1999 (evidence file, folios 263 to 284). 115 Special appeal of March 30, 1999 (evidence file, folios 263 to 284). 116 Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of October 3, 2002 (evidence file, folios 304 to 311). Opinion provided by Sofía Tiscornia before the Inter-American Court during the public hearing held on March 11, 2020. 117 28