d'humanité consiste à prendre part au sort des autres hommes; l'inhumanité est l'attitude de celui qui est indifférent au sort des hommes."38 59. The Kantian imperative has effectively been invoked in the vindication of different human rights. An appropriate example is that of the guarantees of the due process of law. It is imperative that a human being, who turns to a court because he considers that his rights were violated, know the reasons that motivated the judgment that refers to him and feels free to request its interpretation if he does not consider it is sufficiently clear. A party cannot be treated as if he were a simple means in the so called “administration or operation of justice” (to mention a post-modern expression, which I find especially irritating). 60. We must invoke here the Kantian imperative, according to which nobody must be treated as a simple means (not even for the “operation of justice”), but instead as an end in themselves. This requires listening to them attentively in a public hearing, offering them the reasons that substantiate the judicial decision that refers to them, clarifying the doubts they may still have after said decision. Only then will the party not feel like a means (for the work of others), and they will go on to feel as an end in themselves.39 61. There are duties of justice with regard to others, characterized by a universal nature, among which we find, within the Kantian line of thought, respect (Hochachtung) for the rights of others; the obligation to respect the rights of others is imposed on each human being.40 And, as has been stated, each person has the right to know the reasons on which a judgment that refers to him or her is founded, and to participate with all freedom [of expression] in the corresponding trial. If, in the end, there is something left to clarify, there is no reason why the Tribunal would exempt itself from doing so, - without this implying even the slightest modification or deference of an apparent intent to appeal, the corresponding judgment. VIII. Clarification and Substantiation. 62. Article 67 of the American Convention states that “the judgment of the Court shall be final and not subject to appeal," and that "in case of disagreement as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall interpret it at the request of any of the parties, provided the request is made within ninety days from the date of notification of the judgment.” The indication that can be concluded from Article 67 of . E. Kant, Leçons d'éthique, op. cit. supra n. (24), p. 336. – In the XX century, in a similar line of concern and reasoning, Gustav Radbruch stated that the essence of the notion of person lies in equality before the law and the equal juridical capacity of human beings (inherent to them, regardless of the powers granted to them by the legal system); the relationship between “being” and “end” established herein, - G. Radbruch warned, - "is precisely inverse to that established in organicism theories.” In synthesis, “to be a person is the same as being an end-in-themselves (Selbstzweck);" G. Radbruch, Filosofia do Direito, 4a. ed. rev., volume II, Coimbra, A. Amado Ed., 1961, pp. 18-20. 38 . E.L. Pincoffs, "Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction", in Due Process (eds. J.R. Pennock y J.W. Chapman), N.Y., N.Y. University Press, 1977, pp. 172-181. 39 . 40 E. Kant, Leçons d'éthique, op. cit. supra n. (24), p. 331.