152. In effect, in its mentioned Judgment of 09.22.2006 in the case of Goiburú et al., the Court, upon verifying violations to the jus cogens in the cas d'espèce, stated that "(...) Access to justice is a peremptory norm of international law and, as such, gives rise to obligations erga omnes for the States to adopt all necessary measures to ensure that such violations do not remain unpunished (...)." (para. 131)128 Little after that, in its Judgment of 11.29.2006 in the case of La Cantuta versus Peru, the Court made this statement once again (para. 160). The gradual expansion of the material content of the jus cogens, recently including the right to a fair trial, has occurred pari passu with the recent judicial condemnation of grave violations of human rights and massacres, which are, in my opinion, true State crimes.129 153. If the Court were to regretfully abandon this jurisprudential construction, it would be failing to comply with its duty of maximum judicial body for the safeguarding of human rights within the Inter-American protection system, and within the framework of the universality of human rights. As stated in the doctrine on international law, the international jus cogens expands in the realm of operation of a true international ordre public, to tend to the highest interests of the international community as a whole and it highlights the need of judicial control in the compliance of the peremptory regulations of International Law.130 154. It is not at all surprising that it has been precisely in the sphere of the protection of the fundamental rights of human beings that the material content of the jus cogens is defined.131 Today nobody would question, v.g., that the prohibitions of . The importance of this new expansion of the material content of the jus cogens, by the Court in its Judgment of 09.22.2006, in the case of Goiburú et al., so that it includes the right to a fair trial, and the importance and implications of this notable jurisprudential progress, are emphasized in my Concurring Opinion (paras. 62-68) in that case, in which I also referred to the criminalization of the grave violations of human rights; the State’s crime within the context of the State’s terrorism (the already mentioned “Condor Operation”, and the concealment by the State of the atrocities perpetrated); the State’s international responsibility aggravated by the State’s crime; and new elements of the necessary complementary nature between International Human rights Law and contemporary International Criminal Law. 128 . Cf., in this regard, A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Complementarity between State Responsibility and Individual Responsibility for Grave Violations of Human Rights: The Crime of State Revisited", in International Responsibility Today - Essays in Memory of O. Schachter (ed. M. Ragazzi), Leiden, M. Nijhoff, 2005, pp. 253-269. 129 . Cf., inter alia, K. Zemanek, "How to Identify Peremptory Norms of International Law", in Völkerrecht als Wertordnung - Festschrift für C. Tomuschat (eds. P.-M. Dupuy et alii), Kehl, N.P. Engel Verlag, 2006, pp. 1108, 1114, and 1117; and cf., for a discussion, R. Kolb, Théorie du Ius Cogens International, Paris, PUF, 2001, pp. 68-83 and 172-181; cf. also, v.g., E.P. Nicoloudis, La nullité de jus cogens et le développement contemporain du Droit international public, Athènes, Éd. Papazissi, 1974, pp. 41-45 and 227-228. 130 . G. Cohen-Jonathan, "Du caractère objectif des obligations internationales relatives aux droits de l'homme - Quelques observations", in Les droits de l'homme et la Constitution - Études en l'honneur du Prof. G. Malinverni (eds. A. Auer et alii), 131