11 ordered (Statute, Article 79, and Rules of Procedure, rule 98),31 and this was established by decision of the Assembly of the States Parties of December 3, 2005.32 37. The presence of the victims in the proceedings before the ICC represents, I believe, a significant point of confluence between contemporary international criminal law and international human rights law. This is no longer merely punitive justice, but also reparatory justice (Rome Statute, Article 75), establishing different forms and means of reparation (ICC Rules of Procedure, rule 98),33 both individual and collective. It is not surprising that, in its first rulings – in the Th. Lubanga Dyilo case and the investigation of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo34 - the ICC has referred expressly to the rich case law of the Inter-American Court.35 International human rights law and contemporary international criminal law can provide mutual reinforcement, to the ultimate benefit of the individual. 38. The consolidation of the legal status of the individual in international criminal law, as an active and passive subject of international law strengthens accountability under international law for abuses perpetrated against the individual. Thus, individuals are also bearers of obligations under international law, which is reflected in the consolidation of their international legal status.36 Developments in international legal status and international responsibility occur pari passu, and this whole evolution testifies to the formation of the opinio juris communis to the effect that the gravity of certain fundamental human rights directly affects basic values that are shared by the international community as a whole.37 2. The complementarity between the international responsibility of the State and that of the individual 39. An additional element for an approximation to the complementarity between international human rights law and international criminal law resides in the area of responsibility, encompassing, in my opinion, at the same time, the State and the individual (as subjects of international law). As I have been indicating since my separate opinions in the Myrna Mack Chang (2003) and Plan de Sánchez Massacre 31 . Ibid., pp. 53 and 155-156. 32 . The decision was adopted by consensus; cf. ICC, 4th Assembly of the States Parties of the International Criminal Court (The Hague, 28.11-03.12.2005), p. 2. For the text on the Trust Fund for Victims, cf. ICC, Trust Fund for Victims, resolution ICC-ASP/4/Res.3, pp. 320-333. 33 . ICC, Selected Basic Documents Related to the International Criminal Court, The Hague, ICC Secretariat, 2005, pp. 52 and 155. 34 . Cf. International Criminal Court (ICC)/Pre-Trial Chamber I, doc. ICC-01/04, of January 17, 2006, pp. 14-15, 29 and 34; ICC-01/04, of March 31, 2006, p. 12; and ICC-01/04, of July 31, 2006, pp. 8-9. 35 . E.g., in cases such as: Blake v. Guatemala, 1998; the Street Children v. Guatemala, 1999; El Amparo v. Venezuela, 1996; Neira Alegría v. Peru, 1996; Paniagua Morales v. Guatemala, 2001; Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, 2001. 36 . H.-H. Jescheck, “The General Principles of International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute,” 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004) p. 43. 37 . Cf., e.g., A. Cassese, “Y a-t-il un conflit insurmontable entre souveraineté des États et justice pénale internationale?” in Crimes internationaux et juridictions internationales (eds. A. Cassese and M. DelmasMarty), Paris, PUF, 2002, pp. 15-29; and cf., generally [various authors], La Criminalización de la Barbarie: La Corte Penal Internacional (ed. J.A. Carrillo Salcedo), Madrid, Consejo General del Poder Judicial, 2000, pp. 17504.