7 19. At the conceptual level, I ultimately do not see how not to admit in general international law that crimes of State occur, especially insofar as there is intent (fault or blame), or tolerance, acquiescence, negligence, or omission, by the State in connection with grave violations of human rights and of International Humanitarian Law committed by its agents, even on behalf of a State policy. Under said circumstances, societas delinquere potest. 20. In Law, every person constitutes a center or unit of imputation. In the case of physical persons, it is the concrete and living unit of each human being, while the legal person, a creation or construction of the Law, is also a center or unit of imputation for the conduct of individuals acting on its behalf, and for the consequences for which the legal person, as well as its agents, must answer. In brief, the legal personality of a collective entity (such as the State) is a construction of the Law, and it constitutes a unit of imputation for its conduct, carried out by the individuals who compose said collective entity and who act in its behalf; thus, both the legal person and said individuals must answer for the consequences of their acts or omissions,22 especially when they bring about grave violations of human rights and of International Humanitarian Law. In my view, international responsibility of the State and the international criminal responsibility of the individual are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary and inexorably intertwined. IV. Types of Culpability and Crimes of State 21. This leads me to some brief reflections on the typology of culpability and, in this framework, the definition of crimes of State. In his masterly monograph, The question of guilt, the upright juridical philosopher Karl Jaspers established a distinction among four types of culpability: a) criminal culpability, resulting from acts that objectively abridge unequivocal laws, and that are provable before a court of law; b) political culpability, resulting from actions of rulers, of the State, for which those governed are responsible, because “every person is co- responsible for how he is governed;” c) moral culpability, resulting from the actions of each individual, with his own conscience as the jurisdiction; and d) metaphysical culpability, which K. Jaspers commented on as follows: "There is a solidarity among men as such that makes each one responsible for all wrongdoing and all injustice in the world, especially of crimes that happen in their presence or with their knowledge. If I do not do what I can to impede them, I am also guilty.” 23 22. By expressly invoking natural law in his study,24 K. Jaspers considered that “where power does not set limits on itself, violence and terror dominate, and ultimately the annihilation of existence and of the soul.”25 The great thinker admitted the existence of collective guilt (as the political responsibility of the citizens), “but not, by this, in the same form as moral and metaphysical guilt and not as criminal guilt.”26 For 22 . In this regard, Luis Recaséns Siches, Tratado General de Filosofía del Derecho, 16ªth. ed., Mexico, Ed. Porrúa, 2002, p. 272. 23 . Karl Jaspers, El Problema de la Culpa, Barcelona, Ed. Paidós/Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 1965 [repr. in Spanish, 1998], pp. 53-54. 24 Cf. K. Jaspers, op. cit. supra n. (17), pp. 58 and 75. 25 Ibid., pp. 55-56. . .