17 desisted from it “because it was filed as preliminary” objection, but asked the Court to take its content into account when it issues its judgment on the merits. 79. In addition, in said brief the State established that it accepted the following facts: a) Violation of the rights to life, to humane treatment and dignity of the human person committed against Myrna Mack Chang on September 11, 1990, for which Noel de Jesús Beteta Alvarez was convicted by a competent Court that found him guilty of being the direct perpetrator, and that same court identified him as an agent of the State at the time he committed that act. b) The institutional responsibility of the State for the infringements of the law incurred by the agent of the State Noel de Jesús Beteta Alvarez in the aforementioned facts, pursuant to Article 155 of the Political Constitution of Guatemala. c) The institutional responsibility of the State when, in non-compliance with Article 3 of the Political Constitution of Guatemala [...] and Article 4 of the American Convention […], it did not ensure the right to life and to humane treatment of Myrna Mack Chang. d) The institutional responsibility of the State for the slow progress of the proceeding in which [...] there was evidently: • Slow progress of the proceeding that began in February, 1994, to identify and punish the accessories of the violation of the right to life of Myrna Mack Chang; • Unexplainable delay in a judiciary proceeding, stated above, that surpassed the reasonable term set forth in paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the American Convention […]; • Violation of the rights of applicant Helen Mack Chang to access to justice and to respect for the principles of due process and the guarantees set forth in that same first paragraph of Article 8 of the American Convention […]. 80. The State, in turn, pointed out that it was making “a partial acceptance of the facts alleged by [Helen Mack Chang], as the latter alleges other [facts] that the State of Guatemala is not institutionally able to accept, such as all those that the Commission has interpreted extensively, in its own manner […].” Derived from the above, the State “can neither ignore nor deny the rights that applicant Helen Mack Chang […] has in substantive and procedural terms.” The State also expressed that: it is necessary to place on the historical record that the State of Guatemala cannot, based on the acknowledgment of the aforementioned institutional responsibilities, violate the independence of its domestic legal system, and it is not able to decide on the measures of reparation without facing its internal audit and oversight system regarding management of public resources by the General Comptrollership. The above entails the need for said determination to be made by issuing of a judgment by a competent judicial body, either domestic or international, or –if there were the possibility of a friendly settlement approved by a competent authority- an agreement that could be discussed with applicant Helen Mack Chang. 81. Finally, the State pointed out that it submits to the international jurisdiction of the Court for “[d]efinition of the scope of its institutional responsibility in the instant case and the effects derived from it regarding reparations;” that it was appropriate for the Court to continue the reparations stage of the proceeding, and that the public hearing summoned was unnecessary. 82. At the start of the public hearing on February 18, 2003, the State reiterated orally its waiver of all the preliminary objections and it expressed that: […] the State of Guatemala deemed it necessary to modify its July 26, 2001 answer to the application, and therefore the object of that modification of the answer to the application is as follows: first, it ratifies what it stated at that time regarding the actions of the State of Guatemala before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.