58 134.12. the decision to execute certain persons was accompanied by acts and maneuvers that sought to obstruct the judicial proceedings directed at elucidating the facts and punishing those responsible;50 134.13. during the armed conflict and even today, the courts in Guatemala have been incapable of effectively investigating, prosecuting, trying, and punishing those responsible for human rights violations.51 The courts have often subordinated their actions to the executive branch or to military influence, “applying legal provisions or rules that are contrary to due process or not applying those they should have;”52 With respect to the structure of military intelligence and the functions of the Presidential General Staff 134.14. the intelligence services in Guatemala have been responsible for multiple human rights violations;53 134.15. the intelligence services have changed their structure and internal organization over time, in response to government policies, to military dynamics proper, and to evolution of the armed conflict. Guatemalan intelligence has been designed, and its operations directed and executed mainly by two bodies: the Intelligence Section of the Army, subsequently called Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the National Defense and generally known as “D-2”, and the intelligence unit of the Presidential General Staff, where there have been levels of operational coordination;54 50 Cf. report by the Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, “Guatemala, memoria del silencio,” volume II, page 369. 51 Cf. expert opinion of Mónica Pinto rendered before the Court on February 19, 2003; report by the Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, “Guatemala, memoria del silencio,” volume V, page 45; and “Informe del Experto independiente, Sr. Christian Tomuschat, sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Guatemala, preparado de conformidad con el párrafo 11 de la resolución 1991/51 de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos” (United Nations) of January 21, 1992 (file with annexes to the application, annex 52, leaves 1020 to 1024). 52 Cf. testimony by Helen Mack Chang, Nadezhda Vásquez Cucho and Henry Monroy Andrino rendered before the Court on February 18 and 19, 2003; expert opinions of Iduvina Hernández and Mónica Pinto rendered before the Court on February 18 and 19, 2003; report by the Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico, “Guatemala, memoria del silencio,” volume III, pages 113 to 114; and “Informe del Experto independiente, Sr. Christian Tomuschat, sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Guatemala, preparado de conformidad con el párrafo 11 de la resolución 1991/51 de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos” (United Nations) of January 21, 1992 (file with annexes to the application, annex 52, leaves 1020 to 1024). 53 Cf. expert opinions of Iduvina Hernández and Katharine Doyle rendered before the Court on February 19, 2003; report by the Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico, “Guatemala, memoria del silencio,” volume II, pages 74 to 76; Report by the Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica, “Guatemala: Nunca Más: los mecanismos del horror,” volume II, page 65; and Edgar Gutiérrez, “Hacia un paradigma democrático del sistema de inteligencia en Guatemala” of October, 1999, pages 56 to 61 (file with annexes to the brief with requests, pleadings and evidence of the representatives of the next of kin of the victim, annex R-VII-92). 54 Cf. expert opinions of Iduvina Hernández and Katharine Doyle rendered before the Court on February 19, 2003; Report by the Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica, “Guatemala: Nunca Más: los mecanismos del horror,” volume II, page 65; report by the Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, “Guatemala, memoria del silencio,” volume II, pages 83 to 86; and Edgar Gutiérrez, “Hacia un paradigma democrático del sistema de inteligencia en Guatemala” of October, 1999, pages 51 to 61 (file with annexes to the brief with requests, pleadings and evidence submitted by the representatives of the next of kin of the victim, annex R-VII-92).