8 him, metaphysical guilt, in turn, is “the lack of absolute solidarity with the human being as such; [...] ultimately, true collectivity is the solidarity of all men before God.” 27 23. K. Jaspers did not excuse himself from discussing the different consequences of the various types of guilt: criminal guilt entails punishment; political guilt entails responsibility; moral guilt entails repent and renewal; and metaphysical guilt entails “a transformation of human self-awareness before God.”28 In addition, this admirable author concluded, firmly and persuasively, "There are crimes of State, which are always and at the same time crimes of certain individuals. [...] Whoever [...] orders or commits a crime is –that is the idea- always tried as a person by the community of States of the world. Under such a threat, the world’s peace would be ensured. Humanity would join in an ethos comprehensible to all. Never more would we repeat what we have suffered: that men, whose dignity had been stolen by their own State, whose human rights had been abridged, who were marginalized or murdered, did not find protection in the higher community of States.”29 24. Along this same line of thought, another juridical philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, in his essay La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli, invoking Karl Jaspers’ thinking, also referred to culpability for State policies involving criminal responsibility, and expressly used the term “crime of State.”30 Said political culpability, "résulte de l'appartenance de fait des citoyens au corps politique au nom duquel les crimes ont été commis. [...] Cette sorte de culpabilité engage les membres de la communauté politique indépendamment de leurs actes individuels ou de leurs actes individuels ou de leur degré d'acquiescement à la politique de l'État. Qui a bénéficié des bienfaits de l'ordre public doit d'une certaine façon répondre des maux créés par l'État dont il fait partie. [...] Des institutions n'ont pas de conscience morale et [...] ce sont leurs représentants qui, parlant en leur nom, leur confèrent quelque chose comme un nom propre et avec celui-ci une culpabilité historique."31 25. The most enlightened doctrine of international law also contains elements leading to the definition of crimes of State. Thus, already in 1937, Hersch Lauterpacht warned that traditional respect for State sovereignty held back the development of the law of international responsibility, especially where it was most clearly present, that is, regarding the consequences of responsibility. Thus, traditional theory limited responsibility merely to reparation of damages (pecuniary and moral), without the States, due to their sovereignty, being punished. Nevertheless, by removing the State from the consequences of its own violations of the Law, this vision showed itself as a completely arbitrary one, restricting the international action of justice.32 This being so, argued that author vehemently, opposing the prevalent doctrine of the time, 26 Ibid., p. 80. 27 Ibid., pp. 88 and 90. 28 Ibid., p. 57. 29 Ibid., p. 131. 30 31 P. Ricoeur, La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli, Paris, Éd. du Seuil, 2000, pp. 423, 434 and 609. Ibid., pp. 615 and 620. 32 H. Lauterpacht, "Règles générales du droit de la paix", 62 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit . . . . . . .