14 admitted that the responsibility of the State can be both objective and absolute, and under certain circumstances can also be based on fault or blame.49 40. In point of fact, even admitting the principle of objective or absolute responsibility of the State (as the Inter-American Court has rightly done in the case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” versus Chile, 2001), this does not mean that responsibility based on fault or blame is totally dismissed under any and all hypotheses or circumstances. There are cases –as in the instant Myrna Mack Chang versus Guatemala case- in which the intention of the State to cause harm or its negligence in avoiding it can be proven; fault or blame then becomes, here, the indispensable basis for responsibility of the State,50 aggravated by that circumstance. VIII. The Juridical Consequences of Crimes of State: Aggravated International Responsibility and the Nature and Scope of the Reparatio. 41. Aggravated responsibility is, precisely, that which is consistent with a crime of State. The renowned Article 19 of the State Responsibility Project (1976) of the ILC (supra), in its provision regarding “international crimes,” precisely had in mind the determination of an aggravated degree of responsibility for certain violations of international law.51 It did not in any way intend to suggest an analogy with categories of domestic criminal law. Once aggravated responsibility has been accepted, its juridical consequences must be established. 42. Already in 1939, long before becoming the rapporteur of the ILC on International Responsibility of the States, Robert Ago reflected that the same material fact may be apprehended by different rules within the same juridical order, ascribing juridical circumstances to it that are also different, generating the obligation to provide reparation or legitimizing application of a punishment.52 It may thus require either the obligation to provide reparation, or application of a punishment, or both simultaneously; for R. Ago, “punishment and reparation may thus exist side by side, as effects of the same crime.”53 43. The same juridical fact can, thus, give rise to different consequences, such as reparation and punishment. For an especially grave illegal act (e.g. a grave violation of human rights or of International Humanitarian Law), compensatory reparation (for the victim or the victim’s next of kin) may not be sufficient, in which case a punitive reparation (e.g., investigation of the facts and punishment of those responsible) may be required. Both may be necessary for the realization of justice. 49 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 50 Cf., in this regard, H. Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra n. (34), pp. 359-361 and 364. . . 51 . I. Sinclair, "State Responsibility: Lex Ferenda and Crimes of State", in International Crimes of State (eds. J.H.H. Weiler, A. Cassese and M. Spinedi), Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1989, p. 242. 52 . Roberto Ago, "Le délit international", 68 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye (1939) pp. 424 and 426. 53 . Ibid., pp. 428-429.