21 91. On February 24, 2003, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala addressed a note to the President of the Court, in which he referred to the “true scope of the acknowledgment of responsibility by Guatemala in the Mack Chang case” (supra para. 47) and he stated: […] when I signed the note that I sent on February 14 of this year, I was not aware that the persons to whom I entrusted the drafting misinterpreted my instructions and, therefore, incurred in an unfortunate mistake when they limited the acceptance of international responsibility by Guatemala in the instant case to “the same and literal terms set forth before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in March, 2002.” The instructions I gave in this regard were to simply and straightforwardly acknowledge the facts set forth in the application and, pursuant to the general principle stated in Article 52 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, to inform [this] Court that Guatemala unconditionally accepted its international responsibility in the case. I regret that this misunderstanding has caused the erroneous interpretation of my instructions by the Agents of the State of Guatemala, thus giving rise to questioning of the true scope of the acceptance of international responsibility in the Myrna Mack case (furthermore, the controversy regarding this case was extended by the fact that the Representatives of the State temporarily –and also unnecessarily- left the hearing, although I have been informed that they did so with your authorization. In Guatemala, however, this created the false impression that the State was in contempt of the Court). Given these special circumstances, I wish to request [...] that the true will of the Government of Guatemala, expressed in the instant brief, to acquiesce absolutely, be recorded in the case file. 92. With respect to the aforementioned brief by the State, on March 3, 2003 the Commission filed its observations on that brief (supra para. 47), pointing out that Article 52 of the Rules of Procedure invoked by the State refers to the object of the acquiescence, for which reason the Commission interpreted that: given the advanced stage of the proceeding, the February 24, 2003 acquiescence of the State does not only encompass the facts referred to in the application, but also all those that have been duly established by the Commission and by the representatives of the alleged victim in the various procedural stages, and specifically those proven in the public hearing. The Commission also deemed it “crucial” for the Court to expressly issue a ruling on the scope and effects of the acquiescence and to establish that said acquiescence, to be valid, must encompass both the claims stated in the application and the facts proven and the requests made in the public hearings before the Court. 93. That same day, the representatives of the next of kin of the victim, in turn, submitted their observations on the February 24, 2003 brief by the State (supra para. 47), and they asked the Court to rule that said communication is not an acceptable acknowledgment of responsibility under the terms required by Article 52 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. They deem that said brief “does not state anything substantive regarding the acquiescence and merely invokes said term as if that circumstance, in and of itself, was sufficient to fulfill the requirements of Article 52 of the Rules of Procedure.” They deemed that “an absolute acquiescence” consists of complete and unconditional acceptance of the facts and arguments alleged in the application by the next of kin of the victim and proven during the trial and, insofar as the State does not admit them, the dispute among the parties continues and “it must be decided by a ruling of the Court on the merits of the case.” In conclusion, they asked the Court: