- 12 Victim’s Legal Assistance Fund,586 and some vouchers refer, in general, to expenses for office
supplies, without an indication of the specific percentage that corresponds to the expenses for
this case. In fairness, these concepts have been deducted from the calculation made by the
Court. In addition, those expenses the quantum of which is not reasonable will be deducted
from the assessment made by the Court. Also, as it has in other cases, the Court can infer that
the representative incurred expenses during the processing of the case before the interAmerican human rights system derived from the litigation and from attending the hearing held
before the Court and, consequently, they will be taken into account when establishing the
respective costs and expenses.
423. Consequently, the Court decides to establish a reasonable sum of US$40,000.00 (forty
thousand United States dollars) for costs and expenses for the work carried out in the litigation
of the case at the international level, including the expenses arising from the participation of the
two lawyers who collaborated in the defense of the case as of the public hearing. […]
35. First, the Court notes that, as indicated by the State, its request is not related to
a disagreement on the meaning or scope of the ruling ordered in the judgment with
respect to the specific case (supra para 35). On the other hand, this Court considers
that the transcribed paragraphs, and in particular paragraphs 422 and 423, clearly
refer to the criteria used by the Court to determine costs and expenses, based on the
evidence provided by the representative, equity and reasonableness. Therefore, it does
not consider it appropriate or necessary to exert additional pressure in this regard.
D. Application of Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure
36. Meanwhile, the Court mentions that the other two points on which the State and
the representative, respectively, requested interpretation refer mainly to requests to
rectify material errors (supra paras. 2.i and 3.iii). In this regard, Article 76 of the Rules
of Procedure establishes that “[t]he Court may, on its own motion or at the request of
any of the parties to the case, within one month of the notice of the judgment or
order, rectify obvious mistakes, clerical errors, or errors in calculation.
The
Commission, the victims or their representatives, the respondent State, and, if
applicable, the petitioning State shall be notified if an error is rectified.” Regarding the
observations of both parties on the deadline to submit a request for rectification,16 the
Court recalls that although, based on Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure, the parties
may request a rectification of egregious, editing or calculation errors only “within one
month of the notice of the judgment or order;” this period does not apply to any
corrections that the Court may make of its own accord.17
37. Regarding the State's request regarding the position of the informant Federico
Javier Llaque Moya, this Court notes that, indeed, in paragraph 268 of the judgment18
Mr. Federico Javier Llaque Moya is referred to as "Counter-terrorism Prosecutor", while
Both the State and the representative argued that the request to rectify the material error of the
counterparty should have been made within the one-month term provided in Article 76 of the Rules of
procedure.
16
Cf. Case of Escher and others v. Brazil. Monitoring Compliance with judgment. Order of the Court of
May 17, 2010, considering paragraph 15; Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al. (“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala.
Interpretation of the judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of the Court of August 19, 2013,
Series C. No.262, para. 24, and Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and nearby places v. El Salvador
Interpretation of the judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 19, 2013. Series C No.
264, para. 39.
17
In the aforementioned paragraph 268 it is indicated that: “[…] the Court takes note that Federico Javier
Llaque Moya, Counter-terrorism Prosecutor, explained during the hearing in this case that the acquittals
handed down by the “faceless” judges were not annulled “because even in cases in which the standards of
due process were not met, following an acquittal, the case with a final judgment could not be dismissed'
[...]”. Case of J. v. Peru Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, supra, para. 268.
18