-6time of the arrest was necessary (supra paras. 330 and 331). Likewise, the sexual violence of which Ms. J. was a victim also constitutes a violation of her right to personal integrity. 364. In order to define what, in light of Article 5.2 of the American Convention, must be understood as “torture,” in accordance with the Court's case law, an act constituting torture is involved when the ill-treatment: a) is intentional; b) causes severe physical or mental suffering, and c) is committed for any purpose or reason. Likewise, it has been recognized that the threats and the real danger of subjecting a person to physical injuries produce, in certain circumstances, such a degree of moral anguish that it can be considered psychological torture. 365. The Court recalls that at the time of the initial arrest, Ms. J. was blindfolded, beaten, and subjected to sexual touching, and that after leaving the building on Las Esmeraldas street she was not taken directly to the DINCOTE, but was instead in a car for an undetermined period of time while other properties were possibly being searched, during which time she was threatened (supra paras. 354 to 356). Upon analyzing these facts, it is necessary to take into account that, by having been blindfolded, Ms. J. must have been disoriented, which probably increased her degree of anguish and terror about what could happen. These feelings intensified when Ms. J. was driven for some time to an unknown destination, when she was presumably threatened by police officers (supra para 355), without any type of legal guarantee. Within this context, after having been arrested by force, and after having been the victim of sexual violence, for Ms. J. there was a real and immediate risk that these threats would materialize. This is also supported by the existing context at the time of the events. 366. Based on all the circumstances of the case, the Court concludes that the ill-treatment to which Ms. J. was subjected at the time of her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5.2, which prohibits being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 20. From the transcribed paragraphs it can be deduced that the Court did not specify whether the ill-treatment suffered by Ms. J. constituted torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and therefore, the Court considers that it is the State's responsibility, within the framework of its obligation to investigate,9 to determine the specific legal classification that corresponds to these facts, with respect to the behaviors prohibited under article 5.2 of the Convention. 21. Now, based on several statements by the parties and the Commission within this request for interpretation, the Court finds it pertinent to make the following clarifications: (i) this Court concluded that the “inappropriate touching” to which Ms. J. was victim constituted sexual violence, insofar as the statements in the file did not facilitate determining whether there was any form of penetration in said act, however slight;10 (ii) this conclusion does not exclude the possibility that, within the framework of the domestic investigations, it may be determined that said sexual violence also In this respect, in its judgment, the court mentioned that “[the ill-treatment suffered by Mrs. J. on the occasion of her initial arrest] must be investigated effectively in proceedings against those presumably responsible for the attacks on personal integrity and privacy that occurred.” To this effect, it ordered that the State “must open and effectively conduct a criminal investigation into the acts that violated Article 5(2) of the Convention and that were committed against Ms. J., in order to determine the eventual criminal responsibilities and, as appropriate, apply the legal penalties and consequences. This obligation must be met within a reasonable time, taking into consideration the criteria indicated for investigations in this type of case (supra paras. 341 to 352). In addition, The State must expedite the pertinent disciplinary, administrative of criminal actions in the event that, during the investigation into the said facts, it is revealed that there were procedural or investigative irregularities related to them.” Case of J. v. Peru Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2013. Series C No. 275, para. 392. 9 In this regard, the Court recalls that “[r]ape should also be understood as acts of vaginal or anal penetration, without the consent of the victim, using other parts of the perpetrator’s body or objects, as well as oral penetration by the male organ. [… I]n order for an act to be considered rape, it is sufficient that penetration, however slight, occurs, as described above. In addition, it must be understood that vaginal penetration refers to penetration by any part of the perpetrator’s body or by objects of any genital opening, including the labia majora and labia minora, as well as the vaginal orifice." Case of J. v. Peru Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, supra, para. 359. 10