-9constitute a conviction, it did impair the rights of Ms. J., insofar as it affected the final nature of
the acquittal. If the acquittal delivered in favor of Ms. J., had not been declared null and void,
currently there would be no criminal proceedings open against Ms. J. In addition, the Court
considers that the exigency of an adequate reasoning in the said ruling was even greater,
because it annulled an acquittal delivered owing to insufficient evidence based on a supposed
inadequate assessment of the evidence (supra para. 225).
228. In addition, this Court considers that the Supreme Court failed to act in accordance with the
principle of the presumption of innocence, by requiring the lower court “to establish the
innocence or guilt of those accused.” The Court recalls that the principle of the presumption of
innocence requires that no one be convicted unless there is complete evidence or evidence
beyond any reasonable doubt of their guilt. The Higher Court of Lima decided to acquit Ms. J.
because it did not have sufficient evidence of her guilt. By not explaining how the evidence had
been assessed inadequately, or the undue evaluation of the facts, the Supreme Court presumed
that Ms. J. was guilty.
229. Based on the above considerations, this Court finds that the judgment of December 27,
1993, of the “faceless” Supreme Court of Justice failed to comply with the obligation to provide
the reasoning for judicial decisions and infringed the presumption of Ms. J.’s innocence, in
violation of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 8 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1)
thereof.
27. Now, in addition to the foregoing considerations, the Court recalls that when
analyzing the alleged violation of the principle of non bis in idem, it also established
that:
269. Regarding the defects in the judgment of the “faceless” Supreme Court of Justice,
representative indicated that this ruling should not have legal effects because the identity of
judges was secret, and owing to the failure to provide the reasoning for the judgment,
alleged time-barred nature of its delivery, and its illegality (because it had no basis in any of
specific causes established by law).
the
the
the
the
270. In this regard, the Court notes that the secret identity of the judges constituted a common
defect of both courts (supra paras. 102 and 105). In addition, the Court recalls that it has
concluded that the said ruling of the “faceless” Supreme Court lacked reasoning, in violation of
Article 8(1) of the Convention (supra para. 229). Furthermore, since the reasoning for the said
judgment is lacking, it is not possible to determine whether Ms. J. had the opportunity to be
heard during the said nullity proceeding, through her defense counsel, or to exercise an adequate
defense. In addition, the absence of reasoning does not permit the Court to determine the cause
of nullity that was applied, pursuant to the presumptions established in the Peruvian Code of
Criminal Procedures. The Court has established that the reasoning shows the parties that they
have been heard and, in those cases in which the decisions can be appealed, provides them with
the possibility of contesting the decision and obtaining a fresh examination of the matter before
the higher courts. Nevertheless, the Court has no evidence that would permit it to
conclude that the failure to provide the reasoning for the 1993 judgment of nullity
would have the effect of rendering the acquittal delivered previously in favor of Ms. J.
final and non-appealable. [emphasis added]
[…]
273. Consequently, the Court concludes that the State did not violate Article 8(4) of the
Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, to the detriment of Ms. J.
28. This Court considers that the clarification requested seeks for the Court to reexamine the representative's argument, set forth in paragraph 269 of the judgment
cited supra, by which it claimed that the December 27, 1993, decision of the Supreme
Court of Justice had no legal effect. Therefore, under the guise of a request for
interpretation, the representative raises a discrepancy with what was resolved by the
Court. In this regard, this Court reiterates that a request for interpretation cannot be
used as a means of challenging the decision whose interpretation has been requested,
nor to request any modification to the respective judgment (supra para 12). In addition,