VIII.1. THE RIGHTS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 61 AND TO THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 62 IN RELATION TO THE OBLIGATION TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS 63 AND THE OBLIGATION TO ADOPT PROVISIONS OF DOMESTIC LAW 64 A. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 81. There follows a systematization of the arguments of the parties and of the Commission regarding the responsibility of the State for infringing the rights to personal liberty and to the presumption of innocence. 82. It should be recalled that the State made a partial acknowledgement of responsibility in which it admitted that there had been violations of the rights to personal liberty (Art. 7 of the Convention), to to a fair trial (Art. 8) and to judicial protection (Art. 25), in relation to the duty to respect the rights (Art. 1(1), to the detriment of Jorge Marcial and Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López (supra para. 14). Nonetheless, the State argued that there was no infringement regarding the obligations to adopt provisions of domestic law (Art. 2) regarding the existence of arraigo and pretrial detention sua sponte (supra para. 28). Therefore, the Court will only refer to the arguments concerning the infringements to the Convention that were not acknowledged by the State. A.1. On the application of arraigo and the subsequent preventive detention 83. The Commission and the representatives recalled that at the time of the events the institution of arraigo was set out in Article 133 bis of the Federal Code of 1999. That norm provided that in order to detain a person against whom criminal proceedings were being prepared there must exist a wellfounded risk of evading the action of justice. They claimed that the victims were detained on January 12, 2006 and had been under arraigo until April 22, 2006, the date on which the judge of the Third District of Federal Criminal Procedure handed down a formal order of pre-trial detention, which resulted in their preventive detention. During that period, they were under the control of the OPP and were not taken before a judicial authority so that the lawfulness and the non-arbitrariness and the continued detention for such a period could be reviewed. They added that the State did not present detailed information, neither in the original order nor subsequently, that would justify the application of arraigo for three months. 84. They considered that arraigo was contrary to the Convention and, in the present case, there was an arbitrary detention since it did not have a legitimate purpose nor did it comply with the requisites of suitability, necessity and proportionality. They also claimed that the duration of the arraigo was unreasonable. Finally, they argued that the application of arraigo affected the right to the presumption of innocence of the victims. They concluded that the State violated the rights contemplated in Articles 7(1), 7(3), 7(5) and 8(2) of the Convention, read in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, to the detriment of Jorge Marcial Tzompaxtle Tecpile, Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López. 85. With respect to the pre-trial detention, the Commission and the representatives argued that, after the formal order of pre-trial detention of April 22, 2006, the victims continued to be deprived of liberty after the arraigo and in pre-trial detention. They maintained that the formal order of pre-trial detention did not include any grounds regarding the procedural purposes that the measure of pre-trial detention sought that would make its application proper and that the victims were not tried and judged while at liberty. Nor were there grounds on the procedural purposes of the decision of February 22, 61 Article 7 of the Convention. 62 Article 8(2) of the Convention. 63 Article 1(1) of the Convention. 64 Article 2 of the Convention. 22