2007 on the appeal of the formal order of pre-trial detention. This was sufficient to establish that the pre-trial detention that was applied between April 2006 and May 2008, when they were released after their acquittal, was arbitrary. Therefore, they concluded that the State was responsible for violating Article 7(1) and 7(3), read in conjunction with Article 1(1), to the detriment of Jorge Marcial Tzompaxtle Tecpile, Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López. 86. The representatives added that the violation of the obligation to adopt provisions of domestic law is internationally an unlawful act of a continuous nature since the State has maintained in its legal order the institutions of pre-trial detention sua sponte and arraigo, which have not been repealed nor derogated, although their texts have been changed, and they now are included in the Mexican constitution. 87. As to the alleged violation of the duty to adopt provisions of domestic law because of the continued existence of arraigo and pre-trial detention sua sponte, the State claimed that those two institutions respond to historical contexts as the country continues to be affected by an increase in the financial and structural capacities and the internationalization of organized crime. Nonetheless, the State manifested that it had implemented actions to balance its obligation to ensure the public security of its people and to combat organized crime with its obligation to respect the human rights of all persons. The State added that the reforms and modifications to arraigo have resulted in a drastic decrease in its use nationally and that its exceptional nature that has been sought since its establishment appears to be consolidating. 88. The State affirmed that pre-trial detention is found in the Mexican Constitution, Article 19 of which provides an exhaustive list of the offenses in which it is granted sua sponte. It claimed that this measure is not a punishment but rather is a precautionary measure to ensure that justice is imparted properly. The State added that it is a measure that is applied to a limited number of offenses and that it responds to the seriousness of specific conducts, as well as to the need to ensure that the persons allegedly responsible do not evade the action of justice. It added that the circumstances of each case are considered before being ordered, thus allowing judicial control of the institution. 89. The State concluded that it is not responsible for the alleged violation of the duty to adopt provisions of domestic law since arraigo with its characteristics when the events occurred no longer exists and that the Court cannot make an analysis in the abstract of a norm that has not been applied to the specific case. A.2. On the right to be brought before a judge or competent court that would decide on the lawfulness of the arrest or detention 90. The Commission indicated that, while the victims were subjected to arraigo, a writ of amparo was filed on March 6, 2006 alleging that their detention was arbitrary. The First District Judge of Amparos on Criminal Matters of the Federal District dismissed this recourse by holding that, while it was under consideration, the victims were brought before a trial judge. The writ of amparo took at least a month and a half to resolve, which the Commission considered to be excessive, especially taking into account the arbitrary deprivation of the victims’ liberty. It also argued that the State did not insist on objective grounds to exercise legal authority since the victims were detained on the basis of a suspicion and that the State considered the grounds given by the agents of the police to be valid, which in the Commission’s criteria were not sufficient to justify the deprivation of liberty based on the suspicion of a crime. 91. The representatives added that the writ of amparo that might have been an appropriate recourse was ineffective since it was dismissed due to the “change in the legal situation,” which impeded a ruling on the merits. This justification of inadmissibility implies that the resolution of the writ of amparo was so delayed as to not be able to review the lawfulness, the constitutionality and the conventionality of arraigo before the end of the term of the measure. Moreover, the judicial authorities did not analyze the conventionality of pre-trial detention. 92. The Commission and the representatives, thus, considered that the recourse of amparo was not 23