133. The Court notes that Article 12 of the Federal Law of 1996 established that a judge may order arraigo, which “may be extended for the period strictly necessary for processing of the preliminary investigation, […] so that the person in question may participate in clarifying the events imputed to him, which might reduce the period of arraigo (supra para. 37). 134. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds it clear that, under this norm, one of the objectives of the restriction to the personal liberty of persons subjected to arraigo is to obtain a statement on the unlawful acts that are attributed to them, since in whatever other way could they be understood to “participate” in “clarifying” those acts. Therefore, the Court has no doubt that the text of Article 12 infringes, per se, the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself (Article 8(2)(g)) since it establishes as an objective a measure that restricts liberty by obtaining a statement of the person investigated for an unlawful act without contemplating the possibility that this person may remain silent or not be compelled to be a witness against himself. In addition, the law provides an incentive for the accused to declare (or, in other words, to renounce the right to remain silent) since it provides that if he participates in clarifying the acts attributed to him the term of arraigo may be reduced. 115 c. On the defenselessness of the person subjected to arraigo 135. The Court notes that, according to the expert Luis Raúl González Pérez, when arraigo is applied, persons subjected to it do not receive advance and detailed notice of the accusation that is intended to be formulated against them nor are they given adequate time and means to prepare a defense. In addition, persons subject to arraigo do not have “the opportunity to question the actions of the Public Prosecutor’s Office nor to offer any evidence at that stage.” 116 In effect, they are not able to interrogate witnesses or to obtain the appearance of other persons who may shed light on the events. According to the expert, this institution is contrary to “the basis of adversarial and oral criminal proceedings every time that two of its principles are affected: the right that every hearing is in the presence of a judge, which does not occur in cases of arraigo, and the burden of proof to prove guilt is on the accusing party, which in the case of arraigo, loses its meaning since the person is held without any proof of guilt.” 117 136. The Court finds that this complete defenselessness of persons subject to arraigo, without knowing the rationale for the situation in which they find themselves, without timely access to a legal defense and without being able to be brought before a judge is a form of coercion by the authorities, for which reason the evidence obtained in those circumstances should not be used as the basis of an eventual conviction in a criminal proceeding. The Court recalls that Article 8(3) establishes that “a confession of guilt by the accused shall only be valid if it is made without coercion.” It is illustrative to recall that the expert Luis Raúl González Pérez indicated that arraigo also implies “suffering the effects of an anticipated punishment of deprivation of liberty without there being a formal accusation that would permit initiating legal proceedings, but rather used to cause anxiety and uncertainty conducive to breaking the will of the person and put him at the disposition of the actions that they wish to carry out.” 118 137. The Court notes that an eventual statement or obtained evidence is not an indirect consequence of arraigo, but rather it is the very purpose of the institution, as can be seen from Article 133 bis of the Federal Code of 1999 and, above all, from Article 12 of the Federal Law of 1996. 138. In view of the above, the simple subjection of persons to arraigo presupposes placing them in a situation of maximum vulnerability, which is against human dignity, exposes them to mental and possible physical suffering and leaves them in a state of uncertainty about their situation and fate. In this sense, given the conditions of detention, isolation and incommunicado, arraigo places persons 115 In addition, at the public hearing, Jorge Tzompaxtle stated that he was interrogated by someone who had claimed to be a public defender, which the State refuted. 116 Cf. Expert opinion of Luis Raúl González Pérez, offered at the public hearing. 117 Cf. Expert opinion of Luis Raúl González Pérez, offered at the public hearing. 118 Cf. Expert opinion of Luis Raúl González Pérez, offered at the public hearing. 33