subject to this measure in a context of vulnerability faced with an eventual and probable cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in the absence of a fair trial and, therefore, the application of this measure presupposes a violation of Article 5(2) of the Convention. iii. On the substantive assumptions, the purpose and the need for arraigo a. On the substantive assumptions 139. As was mentioned supra, in applying precautionary measures that restrict liberty, there must exist sufficient indicia to allow a reasonable assumption that an unlawful act occurred and that the persons subjected to the process have participated in it. In turn, a suspicion or sufficient indicia that allow a reasonable assumption that the person subjected to the process participated in the unlawful activity must be based and expressed on specific facts; in other words, not on mere conjectures nor on abstract intuitions (supra para. 103). 140. In this case, the Court notes that the decision of January 18, 2006, which ordered arraigo, contained certain information that linked the persons investigated to an unlawful act. 119 141. Notwithstanding the above, the Court notes that neither of the two norms that govern arraigo clearly establishes what are the substantive assumptions that must be met in order to apply this type of restrictive measures to personal liberty and to the presumption of innocence. Article 133 of the Federal Code of 1999 referred “to a person against whom criminal proceedings are being prepared.” On the other hand, Article 12 of the Federal Law of 1996 indicated that the judge may order arraigo “taking into account the nature of the alleged event and the personal circumstances of the accused.” 142. The Court, thus, concludes that the two norms that govern arraigo did not refer to the substantive assumptions that must be met to apply that type of measure that restricts personal liberty. Therefore, arraigo was ordered without any substantive assumption that justifies its application and, therefore, violates the right to the presumption of innocence. b. On the purpose 143. The Court observes that Article 133 bis establishes a legitimate purpose for applying arraigo since it requires that “there exists a well-founded risk of evading the action of justice.” However, the arraigo found in Article 12 of the Federal Law of 1996 established that arraigo could be applied when it was necessary for the proper processing of the investigation with the object that the accused participate in clarifying the acts imputed to him. On this point, the Court recalls that its case law consistently holds that the finality of precautionary measures that deprive or restrict liberty must be compatible with the Convention (supra para. 96). In turn, pursuant to that treaty, a measure that restricts liberty only has two purposes: that the accused does not impede the development of the proceedings nor evade the action of justice (supra para. 106). If not, the rights to personal liberty and to the presumption of innocence would be infringed (supra para. 142). 144. In view of the above, the requirement in Article 12 does not comply with any of the legitimate purposes established in the Convention to restrict the liberty of a person who is being tried. In effect, it is derived from the phrase “so that the person in question may participate in clarifying the events imputed to him,” which would legitimate the deprivation of liberty for investigative purposes, without complying with any of the procedural situations related to the risk of evading justice or with impeding the development of the proceedings, requirements that must also be well-founded. It must be remembered that the State authorities cannot detain in order to then investigate. During the period of investigation, those authorities must, with the support of the police and other specialized bodies, investigate the act denounced and gather the evidence on the basis of which they may present an accusation before a court against the person investigated. 119 Cf. Order of Arraigo 03/2006, decreed by the Fourteenth District Court for Federal Criminal Proceedings, January 18, 2006 (evidence file, ff. 383 and 386). 34