175. The Court has considered, in determining whether the time period is reasonable, whether the party’s procedural conduct to obtain justice somehow helped unduly prolong the process.422 176. In the case before us, this Court found in the previous section (supra para. 157 to 170) that the rules governing the process of enforcement of labor judgments against municipal governments were unclear and that the means provided by domestic law were ineffective. Accordingly, procedural activity performed during these cases included such court motions as requests for mayoral executive orders to be issued for payment, requests for arrest warrants, requests for attachment of assets, and the signing of payment plans, but the final decision on whether it would be possible to pay the debts upheld in the judgments was out of the hands of the parties because there was no means for requiring the State to provide financial resources to pay the amounts ordered. It can therefore be stated that the procedural action by the parties, or lack thereof, was not a causal factor in the excessive amount of time taken up by the procedures for enforcement of judgment. B.3.3. The conduct of judicial authorities 177. It has been the Court’s understanding that in order for judgments to be fully effective, the judicial authorities must act quickly and without delay, because the principle of effective judicial protection requires that enforcement procedures be carried out without obstacles or undue delay so that they attain their objectives quickly, fully, and in a straightforward manner.423 178. Also to be considered is the above discussion of rules and procedures governing the process of enforcing labor judgments against the municipalities, which were found to be vague and ineffective. Indeed, the fact that judicial authorities were unable to order mandatory measures, combined with the inadequacy of the only measure available—an arrest warrant against the mayor—makes it very difficult for judicial authorities to carry out a prompt, comprehensive procedure for payment of the debts. Thus, in view of the refusal of the municipalities to carry out the terms of the judgments if the sitting mayor was no longer the same one who had been in office at the time the original debt was incurred,424 the judicial authority had no way to move the procedure forward. This was evident in the specific case when the municipalities filed briefs with the courts arguing that they were unable to comply with the judgments, and the courts responded by issuing orders that could do nothing more than take cognizance of the excuses being raised.425 Therefore, it is the very structure of the procedure, based on the regulations in force at the time, which were vague and ineffective, that caused the delay of over twenty-five years in enforcing the judgments against the municipalities. B.3.4. Impact 179. Finally, with regard to the impact on the alleged victim’s legal situation, the Court has held that to determine the reasonableness of the term, the adverse effect of the duration of the 422 Cf. Case of Cantos v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2002. Series C No. 97, para. 57, and Case of Bedoya Lima et al. v. Colombia, supra, note 303. 423 Cf. Case of Mejía Idrovo v. Ecuador, supra, para. 106 and Case of Bedoya Lima et al. v. Colombia, supra, note 304. 424 In fact, as was discussed supra para. 161, after the 2002 reform, Article 32 of the MCOL allowed for an arrest warrant to be issued only for “the mayor during whose term of office the debt giving rise to the trial was contracted.” 425 Cf. For example, the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Chañaral on June 20, 2005, in the framework of the process Benavides Montaña et al. v. the Municipality of Chañaral, Docket No. 18,629-1994 (evidence file, folio 1342), or the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Chanco on August 13, 2010, in the framework of the process Abarza Farías et al. v. the Municipality of Chanco, Docket No. 217-1993 (evidence file, folio 15642). 61