22. Based on the foregoing arguments, the petitioner requests the IACHR to declare the Argentine State responsible for violation of Sebastian’s and his family’s human rights in the case under examination. B. Position of the State 23. The State concurs with the petitioner regarding the sequence of the principal events involved in the accident, the severity of the injuries sustained by Sebastian and the objective determination of responsibility as handed down by the domestic courts. It affirms its view that shared responsibility (70% State’s responsibility and 30% Sebastian’s responsibility) was appropriate, given that 14-year-old Sebastian was aware of the risks entailed in using unknown equipment on an abandoned property. 24. The State claims that even though the IACHR noted in its admissibility report that it was not competent to rule on the damages amount awarded, time and time again the petitioner argues before the IACHR that the amount is inadequate and it is disproportionate to the injuries sustained by his son. The State further contends that the only irregularity in the judicial proceedings being alleged by the petitioner is a delay caused by the courts. According to the State, the petitioner gives no reasons as to why the judicial proceedings had been protracted, as he just mentions, in general, that the State took a long time to recognize ownership of the land on which the accident occurred. 25. As for the delay, in citing case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Acosta Calderon and Yakye Axa Indigenous Communities cases, the State contends that said court takes three elements into account to determine reasonability of length of time of a proceeding, which are: a) the complexity of the matter, b) the procedural activity of the interested party and c) the conduct of the judicial authorities. The State further argues that under the civil code and civil procedural code, the petitioner has the burden of driving the course of the proceedings, and that “for more than 5 years, [the case] was practically paralyzed by the procedural inactivity” of the petitioner’s attorney. Thus it claims that the State is not responsible for the supposed delay in recognizing ownership of the property where the accident occurred. The State then goes on to describe the periods of procedural inactivity that occurred during these first years of the domestic proceedings. 26. Furthermore, the State contends that the petitioner filed the civil suit two years after the accident occurred and that the court immediately certified it to the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office to rule on the jurisdiction of the Federal Civil and Commercial Court in the case. Bearing in mind that the court is on holiday in January, the prosecutor ruled on February 11, 1991, that the court did have jurisdiction. The State claims that the petitioner’s attorney did not file the actual brief of the complaint instituting the proceedings until two months after the initial suit, and that after that, one month passed before she [petitioner’s attorney] requested the case to proceed. 27. The State claims that it cannot be responsible for undue delay in recognizing ownership of the land during those first five years, because it had not even been served notice of the filing of the complaint. It asserts that on November 14, 1991, the judge requested the plaintiff to specify who the complaint was directed against and, instead of responding to the request, the attorney asked for information to be requested from the Property Registry, “thus instituting a proceeding which, as a result of her own lack of expertise and procedural inactivity, was drawn out over more than five years.” The State adds that the petitioner’s attorney did not respond until February 22, 1996 that the suit was being filed against the Ministry of Defense. In said communication, the State also claims that in the response to the judge’s request of November 14, 1991 “four months later, on March 13, 1992, Furlan’s attorney said that the suit was against the