required to take into account the context and other events that are outside its competence, because the political and historical circumstances are crucial for establishing the legal consequences of the case, as well as the nature of the violations of the Convention and the corresponding reparations.47 Thus, the analysis of the facts and the human rights violations for which the Court has competence in the terms of Chapter IV cannot be isolated from consideration of the background and the context in which the events allegedly took place, and the respective legal consequences cannot be determined in the vacuum that decontextualization signifies, since it is alleged that the facts of this case are not isolated events in Guatemala. 53. The Court will now refer to the facts related to the violations alleged in this case, namely: (A) the context in which the facts of this case took place; (B) the appearance of the Diario Militar and the Historical Archive of the National Police; (C) individual facts concerning the forced disappearance of the victims in this case and the circumstances surrounding the disappearances, and (D) the facts relating to the investigation opened by the Public Prosecution Service in 1999. A) Context of the facts 54. From 1962 to 1996 an internal armed conflict took place in Guatemala that had significant human, material, institutional and moral costs. The Historical Clarification Commission (infra para. 58, hereinafter also “the CEH”) estimated that “more than 200,000 people were either killed or disappeared in the internal armed conflict.” During this conflict, the State applied what was known as the “National Security Doctrine,” based on which it used the concept of “internal enemy,” which initially referred to the guerrilla organizations, but was expanded to include “all those persons who identif[ied] with communist ideology or who belonged to an organization – whether it be a trade, social, religious or student organization – or those who, for whatever reason, were not in favor of the established regime.”48 55. During the internal conflict, the intelligence services played a particularly important role. The two main military intelligence agencies were “the Intelligence Section of the Army or the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of National Defense [known as] the ‘G-2’ and a unit of the Presidential Staff, [… known] popularly as ‘La Regional’ or ‘El Archivo.’” Military intelligence was responsible for collecting and examining information on those who were considered internal enemies, based on which the counterinsurgency operations were planned.49 47 Cf. Case of Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 22, 2006. Series C No. 153, paras. 53 and 63, and Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 4, 2012. Series C No. 250, para. 55. 48 Cf. Report of the CEH, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio, Guatemala, United Nations Office for Project Services, 1999, volume II, paras. 769, 772 and 1729, and volume V, conclusions, paras. 1 and 147, Annex 8 of the merits report, available at: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/gmds_pdf/; Peace Secretariat. Presidency of the Republic, La autenticidad del Diario Militar, a la luz de los documentos históricos of the National Police” [The authenticity of the Diario Militar in light of documents from the Historical Archive of the National Police], 2011, Second edition, p. 19 (merits file, tome II, Annex A of the answer to the submission, folio 1170 Bis), and Human Rights Office of the Archbishopric of Guatemala (ODHAG), Guatemala Nunca Más. Informe del Proyecto Interdiocesano “Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica, 1998, volume II, chapter 5, p. 229 (file of the proceedings before the Commission, Annexes, tome I, annex IV, folio 3503). 49 Cf. CEH, supra, volume II, pp. 75 and 76, paras. 947 and 952; affidavit made by expert witness Alejandro Valencia Villa on April 12, 2012 (file of documents received at the public hearing, folios 13296 and 13297), and Peace Secretariat, supra, p. 51. The official name of “El Archivo” was changed several times due to the change of Government; during the Government of Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores it was called “Intelligence Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic.” Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores was in power from August 1983 to January 1986. Cf. CEH, supra, volume I, p. 234 and tome II, p. 85, para. 983. - 21 -