have been found belong. In this regard, the corresponding authority must exhume them
promptly, so that they can be examined by a competent professional.220 The forced
disappearance continues to be executed until the remains have been identified.221
208. Furthermore, this Court has found that, in cases of forced disappearance, based on
the multiple and complex nature of this grave human rights violation, its perpetration
involves the specific violation of the right to juridical personality, because the consequence
of the State’s refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or the whereabouts of the
person is, in conjunction with the other elements of the disappearance, the “removal from
the protection of the law” or the violation of the personal and legal security of the individual,
which directly precludes the recognition of juridical personality.222
209. In this regard, the Court has considered that the intrinsic content of the right to
recognition of juridical personality is, precisely, that the individual is recognized, anywhere,
as a subject of rights and obligations, and that he or she may enjoy the fundamental civil
rights, which entails the capacity to be the possessor of rights (capacity and enjoyment)
and of obligations. The violation of that recognition supposes that the possibility of being the
possessor of civil and fundamental rights and obligations is categorically denied.223 Above
and beyond the fact that the disappeared person is unable to continue enjoying and
exercising other and, eventually, all the rights that he or she also possesses, the
disappearance seeks not only one of the most serious forms of removing a person from the
whole sphere of the legal system, but also denies his or her existence and leaves the
individual in a kind of limbo or situation of legal uncertainty in relation to society and to the
State.224
210. Thus, the Court considers that the 26 disappeared victims were placed in a situation
of legal uncertainty that has prevented them from being the possessors of all their rights
and exercising them effectively, which entails a violation of their right to recognition of
juridical personality and, therefore, of Article 3 of the American Convention. In addition, the
Court emphasizes that the fact that a disappeared person cannot exercise all the rights that
he or she possesses does not mean that the forced disappearance, as a multiple and
complex violation, involves the violation of all those rights that the disappeared person is
unable to exercise,225 as argued by the representatives in relation to the right to indigenous
identity of Juan Pablo and María Quirina Armira López (supra para. 189).
211. Also, as a result of the State’s actions described in this chapter, the Court considers
that the State failed to comply with its obligation not to perpetrate or tolerate the forced
disappearance of persons under any circumstances, as established in Article I of the
American Convention on Forced Disappearance.
220
Cf. Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia, supra, para. 82, and Case of the Río Negro
Massacres v. Guatemala, supra, para. 113.
221
Cf. Case of Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala, supra, para. 84, and Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala,
supra, para. 113.
222
Cf. Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, supra, paras. 90 a 101, and Case of the Río Negro Massacres v.
Guatemala, supra, para. 118.
223
Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Merits, supra, para. 179, and Case of the Río Negro
Massacres v. Guatemala, supra, para. 119.
224
Cf. Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, supra, para. 90, and Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala,
supra, para. 119.
225
Cf. Case of González Medina and family members v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 190.
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