51 remedy applies.176 Among other foundational basis, the vote of the Judge Rapporteur highlighted that the Amnesty Law was “a calculated law,”177 not one for the future, and, as such, it must “be interpreted, as a whole with its text, the reality of and the historic moment in which the law was decreed and not the current reality.” In this sense, the Law implemented “a political decision [in] a moment of conciliatory transition in 1979” given that “all were absolved, some absolving themselves.” The law effectively included in the amnesty all “political agents who participated in derived crimes against the political opposition, those detained or not, during the military regime.”178 The political agreement carried out by the political class that permitted the transition to a State of law “resulted in a particular text, [and therefore], only the Legislative Power could change it. It is not incumbent on the Supreme Federal Court to change normative texts that concede amnesty.” Lastly, regarding the reception or not of Law No. 6.683/79 in the new democratic constitutional order, it indicated that “[the Amnesty] [L]aw of 1979 did not pertain to the declined order. It is integrated in the new [constitutional] order, created in the origin of the new fundamental norm,” and as such, its adaptation to the Constitution of 1988, “is unquestionable.”179 C. Obligation to investigate, and where applicable, punish grave human rights violations in international law 137. Since its first judgment, this Court has highlighted the importance of the State’s obligation to investigate and punish for human rights violations.180 The obligation to investigate, and where applicable prosecute and punish, has particular importance given the severity of the crimes committed and the nature of the injured rights, particularly given that the prohibition of enforced disappearance of persons and its related obligation to investigate and punish those responsible have, for much time now, reached a nature of ius cogens.181 138. The Court reiterates that the obligation to investigate human rights violations is a positive measure that must be adopted by States to guarantee the rights recognized in the Convention.182 The duty to investigate is an obligation of means, and not of results, which should be assumed by the State as a legal obligation in and of itself and not as a simple formality condemned from the onset to be unsuccessful, or a matter of particular interests, which depends on the 176 Cf. Law No. 9.882/99, Articles 10 and 12. Availabe at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9882.htm; last visited on November 20, 2010. Similarly, cf. expert opinion of Mr. Langaro Dipp rendered at the public hearing held on May 21, 2010. 177 According to the Rapporteur, the law-measures “directly regulate specific interests, appearing immediatly and specifically. They consist of a special administrative act[.] The law-measures are an administrative act that [is updated] by the agent of the Administration, [and they entail] the specific sought-after request, to which they are addressed. For this reason, they are laws only in the formal sense, not being, nevertheless, in the material sense.” Vote of the Rapporteur Minister, supra note 175, folio 2641. 178 According to the Rapporteur, “what characterizes this amnesty is its objectivity, what matters is that it refers to one or more crimes, not to specific persons[.] The amnesty [is] conceeded to nondetermined persons.” Vote of the Rapporteur Minister, supra note 175, folio 2617. 179 Vote of the Rapporteur Minister, supra note 175, folios 2598 to 2670. 180 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez. Merits. supra note 25, para. 166. 181 Cf. Case of Goiburú et al., supra note 130, para. 84; Case of Chitay Nech et al., supra note 25, para. 193, and Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña, supra note 24, para. 197. 182 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez. Merits, supra note 25, paras. 166 and 176; Case of Fernández Ortega et al. supra note 53, para. 191, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. supra note 45, para. 175.