16. The Commission considered that the State’s contention did not constitute a preliminary objection; rather, it referred to a matter that corresponded to the merits of the matter. 17. The representatives stressed that, when the international petition was lodged, Mr. Jenkins was deprived of liberty, so that this claim was substantiated. They also indicated that, even though this situation changed at the time of his release, it was necessary to analyze whether the international responsibility of a State ended when the action that resulted in a human rights violation ceased. a.2 Considerations of the Court 18. First, the Court considers that Mr. Jenkins’ acquittal in December 1997 does not affect the Court’s competence to examine the facts of this case – namely, his alleged arbitrary deprivation of liberty from June 8, 1994, until November 13, 1997, as well as the duration of the proceedings of the civil action for damages that he filed – and these will be the subject of the analysis of the merits of the dispute. Second, the Court notes that one of the aspects to be examined in this case consists in determining the compatibility of article 10 of Law No. 24,390, which was applied to Mr. Jenkins, with the American Convention. Therefore, the alleged declaration of the unconstitutional nature of that article does not deprive this Court of its competence to rule in this regard at the time when the facts of this case occurred. The Court notes that this matter corresponds to the merits of the case. Therefore, the Court rejects the preliminary objection filed by the State. B. Failure to exhaust domestic remedies b.1 Arguments of the parties and the Commission 19. The State argued that at the time of both the lodging of the petition before the Commission and its subsequent communication to the Argentine State, and the State’s answering brief, the action for damages on which the international petition was founded had not been filed in the domestic jurisdiction. It argued that, starting with its first communication with the Commission, it had made clear that the petitioner was entitled to file an action for damages under the Argentine Civil Code in force at the time of the events. However, it was not until December 27, 1999, that he filed this remedy in the administrative jurisdiction. 20. The Commission reiterated that, according to the American Convention, one of its principal responsibilities is to take decisions on admissibility; therefore, such decisions should not be reexamined at later stages of the proceedings. It also considered that it was incumbent on the Court to defer to the Commission’s decisions in this regard. It stressed that the petitioner had exhausted all the remedies available in the domestic jurisdiction and, regarding the administrative proceedings for damages, the exception of an unjustified delay in the administration of justice was applicable. 21. The representatives argued that the Commission had already dealt with this objection in its Admissibility Report of October 13, 2004. They also indicated that the briefs submitted by Mr. Jenkins revealed that he had exhausted the available remedies to obtain the benefit of release, a fact that constituted the initial grounds for the international complaint. Lastly, they added that the Court had indicated that the administrative dispute procedure was not a remedy that must necessarily always be exhausted; therefore, it did not inhibit the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. b.2 Considerations of the Court 22. Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention establishes that admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the remedies under domestic law having been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized 7