established by law, both formally and materially;126 (ii) respond to a purpose permitted by the American Convention (“respect for the rights or reputations of others” or “the protection of national security, public order or public health or morals”), and (iii) be necessary in a democratic society (and therefore comply with the requirements of appropriateness, necessity and proportionality).127 105. Regarding the first requirement, (i) strict legality, the Court has established that any restrictions must be previously established by law to ensure that they are not left to the discretion of the public authorities. For this, the criminal definition of a conduct must be clear and accurate, even more so if it concerns convictions under criminal law and not under civil law.128 The second aspect, (ii) the permitted or legitimate purposes, refers to Article 13(2) of the Convention.129 Insofar as this case deals with the restriction of the right to freedom of expression due to a complaint filed by a private citizen, the Court will consider only the purpose stated in subparagraph (a) of the aforementioned Article, namely, respect for the rights or reputations of others. Since this is a legitimate purpose, it is necessary for the State to weigh up the right to freedom of expression of the person who communicates and the right to honor of the person affected. Furthermore, the State has the obligation to provide a judicial remedy so that any person who considers that his honor has been harmed can demand protection.130 Finally, as regards the restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of expression, the Court has understood that they must be (iii) proportionate to the interest that justifies them and closely tailored to the achievement of that legitimate purpose, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of that right. Thus, it is not sufficient to have a legitimate purpose; the measure in question must also respect the principles of proportionality and necessity in restricting freedom of expression. In other words, “this last step of the analysis must consider whether the restriction is strictly proportionate, in such a way that the sacrifice inherent therein is not exaggerated or disproportionate in relation to the advantages obtained from such limitation.”131 106. At the same time, the Court has established that subsequent liabilities may be imposed if the right to honor and reputation has been affected.132 Thus, Article 11 of the Convention establishes that everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. The Court has indicated that the right to honor “recognizes that every person has the right to be respected, prohibits any unlawful attack against his honor or reputation and imposes on the States the duty to provide the protection of the law against such attacks.” In general terms, it has pointed out that “the right to honor is related to self-esteem and self-worth, while reputation refers to the opinion that others have of a person.”133 It has also held that, “both freedom of expression and the right to honor, both rights protected by the Convention, are of the utmost importance. Hence, both rights must be guaranteed in a way that ensures they coexist harmoniously.” Every fundamental right must be exercised with respect and 126 Cf. The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 of May 9, 1986. Series A, No. 6, paras. 35 and 37, and Case of Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 71. 127 Cf. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Series C No. 193, para. 56, and Case of Moya Chacón, supra, para. 71. 128 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177, para. 77, and Case of Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 72. 129 Cf. Case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 30, 2019. Series C No. 380, para. 106, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 106. 130 Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, supra, para. 125 and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 107. 131 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 83, and Case of Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 72. 132 Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, supra, para. 123, and Case of Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 73. 133 Cf. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para. 57, and Case of Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 73. 33