and protection of the right to a healthy environment, in accordance with the Escazú Agreement (supra para. 100). 127. It is also important to note that Chilean law allowed Senator SP to use judicial mechanisms, namely a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or ‘‘SLAPP’’, with the intention of silencing an individual who made statements of public interest on potentially irregular actions. The Court considers that, in addition to affecting Mr. Baraona Bray’s freedom of expression, in this case the imposition of the sentence, as well as the use of the criminal mechanism against him, created a chilling effect, since it inhibited the communication of ideas, opinions and information by third parties, which in turn affected the right to freedom of expression. 128. The Court has established that in the case of speech protected by its public interest, such as that referring to the conduct of public officials in the exercise of their duties, the State’s punitive response via the use of criminal law to protect the honor of a public official is not consistent with the Convention.158 In each specific case, however, the definition of “speech of public interest” depends on the concurrence of three elements –a subjective element, a functional element and a material element - which allows criminal judges a considerable margin of discretion. This means that such an analysis cannot take place before criminal proceedings have been initiated, since a decision of this nature can only be made after a criminal proceeding has begun. Thus, even if the competent judicial authority decides that the criminal sanction is not applicable, the chilling effect that undermines freedom of expression would already have been produced. 129. In view of the foregoing, this Court deems it necessary to continue along the protective path of the right to freedom of expression recognized in Article 13 of the American Convention, on the understanding that, when it comes to crimes against honor that involve insults and the imputation of offensive acts, the prohibition of criminal persecution should not be based on the potential ‘public interest’ classification of the statements that gave rise to the subsequent liability, but rather on the status of the person whose honor has allegedly been affected as a public official or public authority. 130. This approach would prevent the chilling effect caused by filing criminal proceedings, as well as its impact on the enjoyment of freedom of expression, and the weakening and impoverishment of debate on issues of public interest. It would effectively safeguard the right to freedom of expression, because by immediately ruling out the possibility of initiating criminal proceedings, it would prevent the use of this measure to inhibit or discourage dissenting voices or complaints against public officials. 131. At the same time, the Court notes with concern that Article 12(13) of the Chilean Criminal Code establishes as an aggravating circumstance of a crime, “[to] commit it with disparagement or offense against the public authority or in the place where such authority is exercising its functions” (supra para. 46). Although this provision was invoked in the complaint, it was not applied, because it was dismissed as an aggravating circumstance. It was stated in the judgment that, “in the case of a crime against honor, such as slander, if this offense is also considered to aggravate criminal liability, Article 63 of the Criminal Code would be violated.”159 Nevertheless, the Court considers that such rules have the potential, in circumstances similar to those of this case, to have a chilling effect on society with respect to the right to freely express one’s opinion or criticize the actions of public officials. 158 Cf. Case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela, supra, paras. 120 and 122, and Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, paras. 117 and 118. 159 Cf. Judgment issued by the Court of Guarantee of Puerto Montt, on June 22, 2004, supra. 39