requested that the Court declare the violation of Articles 13 and 9 of the American Convention. As for Article 9 of the Convention, in their pleadings and motions brief, the representatives merely asked the Court to declare its violation, without providing specific arguments in this regard. 136. The State referred to the “vagueness of the Commission’s reproach, without clearly articulating the standard of clarity that that the norm should satisfy.” It argued that, in any case, the law is more precise and definite than the Commission claims, in terms of the criminal offense applied to Mr. Baraona's case, since it is not “a single offense of absolutely indeterminate scope, but rather a set of rules that attempt to specify the scope of the offense of defamation in various cases.” According to the State, these provisions contain the description of the criminal conduct, expressed in Article 416 of the Criminal Code; the characterization of different types of insult; the sanction; the application of the exception of veracity to allegations against public employees for facts concerning the exercise of their duties and when the accusation is made to defend a real public interest; the enumeration of six facts that are considered to be of public interest for the application of the exception of truthfulness; the aspects considered to be relevant to the private sphere of individuals; and the grounds for justification in Article 10 paragraph 10 of the Criminal Code, related to the legitimate exercise of a right, which refers to the right to freedom of expression in Article 19 No. 12 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the American Convention. It also mentioned that experience shows that this type criminal offense has not given rise to indiscriminate criminal prosecution that inhibits the exercise of freedom of expression. Consequently, it concluded that there is clearly no violation of Article 9 of the American Convention or of the requirement of legality provided for in Article 13 of the same treaty. B. Considerations of the Court 137. In the case of Kimel v. Argentina, the Court has pointed out that any limitation or restriction of freedom of information must be provided for by law, both in a formal and material sense. However, if the restriction or limitation derives from criminal law, it is necessary to observe the strict requirements characteristic of criminal classification in order to satisfy the principle of legality in this area. Thus, such restrictions must be formulated previously, in an express, accurate, and exhaustive manner.162 In this regard, the Court reiterates that when drafting criminal definitions, it is necessary to use strict and unambiguous terms that clearly delimit the punishable conduct, giving full meaning to the principle of criminal legality. Ambiguity in the formulation of criminal definitions creates doubts and opens the door to the discretion of the authorities. This is particularly undesirable when a person’s criminal liability is to be determined and punished with sanctions that severely affect fundamental rights, such as life or freedom. Norms that do not strictly delimit criminal conduct may end up violating the principle of legality contained in Article 9 of the American Convention.163 138. With respect to strict legality, the Court has stated that restrictions to the exercise of freedom of expression must be previously established by law as a means to ensure that they are not left to the discretion of the public authority. Accordingly, the definition of the conduct must be clear and accurate,164 particularly if it involves criminal convictions and not those of a civil nature.165 162 163 164 165 Cf. Case of Cf. Case of Cf. Case of Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 63. Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 121, and Case Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 63 Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para. 56, Case of Moya et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 72. Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 77, and Case Moya et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 72. 41