presumption of innocence means that the accused does not have to prove that he has not committed the offense of which he is accused, because the burden of proof corresponds to the accuser.83 Moreover, the accused must have the benefit of the doubt. Thus, authoritative proof of guilt is an essential requirement for a criminal conviction, and the burden of proof falls on the accuser and not on the accused.84 In addition, the principle of presumption of innocence means that judges do not initiate the trial with a preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offense with which he is charged.85 97. In the specific case, according to the Resolution of the Disciplinary Court that imposed the sanction of dismissal on the alleged victim, he apparently committed the disciplinary infractions provided for in numerals 5 and 26 of article 64 of Disciplinary Regulations of the National Police, which provided: Article 64. The following are considered offenses of the third degree: [...] 5. Those who commit any act that demonstrates a lack of consideration and respect towards a superior, whether on or off duty. [...] 26. Committing acts of manifest violence or unruly acts against a superior provided that the act does not constitute a crime; [...]. 98. Likewise, the aggravating circumstances stipulated in letters (c), (d), and (m) of Article 30 of the same Regulations were applied to Mr. Mina Cuero, which were as follows: Article 30. For the same purposes of determining the severity of the disciplinary sanction, the following are aggravating circumstances: [...] (c) The act was committed in the presence of personnel in such a way that it can be considered a bad example of maintaining order and discipline; (d) The individual is a repeat offender in committing offenses in terms of frequency and severity; (m) Any other circumstance that, in the opinion of the superior, increases the severity of the offense or suggests the dangerousness of the individual being disciplined. 99. The Court notes that the Disciplinary Court's resolution does not provide sufficient reasoning that would allow for the identification of how the infractions contained in both subsections of Article 64 of the aforementioned Regulation were proven, as no arguments were made that would make it possible to fit the alleged facts within each of the provisions of the applied laws. Furthermore, the Resolution did not provide an explanation as to why the three aggravating circumstances applied in the particular case. The above arguments demonstrate that no examination was conducted of the factual and legal grounds for why his behavior was punishable.86 100. The Court cautions that the grounds established in the Regulations, which was applied to Mr. Mina Cuero, was of an open nature and was related to the "setting of a bad example in maintaining order and discipline."87 The Court reiterates that the precision of a disciplinary Cf. Mutatis mutandis, Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 154, and Case of Manuela et al. v. El Salvador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 2, 2021. Series C No. 441, para. 132. 84 Cf. Mutatis mutandis, Case of Zegarra Marín v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of February 15, 2017. Series C No. 331, para. 123, and Case of Manuel et al. v. El Salvador, supra, para. 132. 85 Cf. Mutatis mutandis,Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 26, 2010. Series C No. 220, and Case of Manuela et al. v. El Salvador, supra, para. 132. 86 Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 257, and Case of Urrutia Laubreaux v. Chile. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 27, 2020. Series C No. 409, para. 129. 87 Cf. Disciplinary Regulations of the National Police, Agreement No. 1070 of the Ministry of the Interior and Police, issued on September 28, 1998, and revoked by Agreement No. 8010 of the Ministry of the Interior, published on February 7, 2017 (case file of evidence, volume II, procedure before the Commission, annex to the State's brief of March 22, 2010, pages 758 to 769). 83