sanctioning regulation may differ from that required by the principle of legality in criminal matters, due to the different types of conflicts that each is meant to resolve. Thus, issues of indeterminacy in a disciplinary offense cannot be examined in the abstract but rather in light of the judge's reasoning at the time of its application. In the Court's view, the application of an open disciplinary grounds does not constitute, in principle, a violation of the right to due process, provided that the jurisprudential parameters that have been defined for that purpose are respected. In this way, when applying open or indeterminate rules, the impact that the conduct carried out may have on the police function must be taken into account, whether it is positively established through the determination of normative criteria for its application or through an adequate reasoning and interpretation of the judge at the time of its application. Otherwise, the scope of these disciplinary grounds would be subjected to the moral or private beliefs of the judge. To that extent, in the absence of normative criteria that guide the conduct of the judge, the reasoning behind the sanctioning decision provides clarity to be given to the open or indeterminate disciplinary grounds. 101. The disciplinary ruling fails to explain why the aggravating circumstance provided in letter (c) of the aforementioned Article 30 would apply, regardless of the specific alleged act, which pertains precisely to the lack of respect towards a superior by the alleged victim. Likewise, concerning letter (d), it was not specified which prior infractions were taken into account to determine the severity of the sanction, to the extent of applying the maximum penalty possible. This was necessary due to the plurality of disciplinary records contained in Mr. Mina Cuero's resume, a document that contained different sanctions, some of which would be understood to have been effectively applied and others nullified by virtue of the legal actions filed. Furthermore, the Resolution also did not specify what "other circumstance" increased the seriousness of the offense committed or the dangerousness of the alleged victim in order to consider the aggravating factor stated in letter (m) and thereby impose the penalty of dismissal. 102. The Court also observes a violation of the right to presumption of innocence, as the lack of specification regarding which previous sanctions were considered and applied as aggravating circumstances, and the imposition of the most severe possible penalty, demonstrates prejudice by the Disciplinary Court, to the detriment of the alleged victim. 103. Likewise, the Court notes that the lack of specification regarding which prior sanctions were considered and applied as aggravating circumstances and the imposition of the most serious possible penalty, constitutes a departure from the duty to state reasons, which also meant a violation of the ne bis in idem principle, since the aggravating circumstance contained in letter (c) of Article 30 of the Disciplinary Regulations of the National Police would have been applied, referring to the execution of the act "in the presence of the personnel,” that is, taking into account for that aggravating circumstance the same conduct under question, as was the lack of respect for other members of the police institution. 104. As a result, the Court concludes that due to the failure to meet the duty of providing reasoning in the administrative resolution and the violation of the presumption of innocence, the State violated Articles 8(1) and 8(2) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of the same international instrument, to the detriment of Mr. Mina Cuero. 105. Regarding the allegations related to the violation of the principle of legality, the Court observes that, in the abstract, the content of paragraphs 5 and 26 of Article 64 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Proceedings of the National Police, as well as subparagraphs (c), (d) and (m) of Article 30 of the same Regulations, provide elements that make it possible to deduce the factual assumptions contained in the law, with the required precision given the disciplinary administrative nature of these precepts. A different matter is that, in its