21 Esperanza was identified as a “hot spot” because it was “a sector where the Elkin Vásquez gang of the ELN has settled.”64 Additionally, a military patrol report of February 3, 1995 concluded that Vereda La Esperanza was a “strategic spot” for operations that are carried out by the ELN, where active members and collaborators of the group “live on the farms that are used as look out points and caches.”65 One FTA member said that Vereda La Esperanza “is a transit sector of FARC, ELN and illegal self-defense force bandits.”66 80. According to a report of June 25, 1996, from General Alfonso Manosalva Flores, Commanding Officer of the 4th Brigade, during May and June of that year “the situation of public order along the Medellín-Bogotá highway was seriously disrupted by the increase of criminal activities of the Carlos Alirio Buitrago and Elkin Gonzáles Narco-Terrorist gangs of the UC-ELN and the EPL,” and therefore as of June 27, 1996, the 4th Brigade was moved under the command of the FTA in order to conduct intelligence operations, combat offensives and “psychological operations” along the MedellínBogotá highway. He stated that two platoons were added to the FTA in order to “increase the unit’s combat power.”67 81. Regarding the work of the FTA along the Bogotá-Medellín highway, army documents show that combat intelligence was gathered “with the few informants that we have” and with the intelligence work of the troops themselves.68 A captain, who belonged to the FTA recounted that intelligence work was conducted “by gathering information through peasants who were on the highway.”69 FTA operations in the area included: i) patrol offensives for searches and area military control in the jurisdiction of each platoon; ii) regional census updates; and iii) check points along the Bogotá-Medellín highway and alternate routs.70 2.2. Paramilitary Presence in Vereda La Esperanza and Information on Links to the Army 82. A report of the Office of the Attorney General noted that the community in the area questioned the effectiveness of the public security forces, because the paramilitary forces would move about without any problem, despite the military base being right there and the presence of the National 64 Annex 17. Plan No. 000969/BR4-BIOSP-S3-375, which is issued by the Ingeniero Pedro Nel Ospina Battalion Command for control over the Medellin-Bogota highway under the responsibility of the Águila Task Force for February 1 to April 30, 1995, dated February 1, 1995. Annex to petitioners’ communication of September 1, 2004. 65 Annex 28. Patrol report of Lieutenant Jaime Hernández Carrillo to the Ospina Battalion Commander, dated February 3, 1995. Annex to petitioners’ communication of September 1, 2004. 66 Annex 12. Statement of National Army Major Carlos Mario Jaramillo Vargas, to the National Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Unit, dated January 27, 2003. Case File No. 233 UNDH. Book No. 2. Compact disk attached to petitioners’ communication of June 24, 2010. 67 th Annex 7. Report No. DIV1-BR4-B3-PO-375 of the 4 Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Alfonso Manosalva Flores, dated June 25, 1996. Case File No. 233 UNDH. Book No. 4. Compact disk attached to petitioners’ communication of June 24, 2010. 68 Annex 11. Tactical Case No. BR14-BIBAR-S3-326 of the National Army, signed by Coronel Carlos Suárez, dated June 10, 1996. Pages 26-34. Book No. 8. Compact disk attached to petitioners’ communication of June 24, 2010. 69 Annex 11. Statement of César Augusto Cárdenas Gonzáles to the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Bogotá, dated February 19, 2001. Book No. 8. Compact disk attached to petitioners’ communication of June 24, 2010. 70 Annex 11. Tactical Case No. BR14-BIBAR-S3-326 of the National Army, signed by Coronel Carlos Suárez, dated June 10, 1996. Pages 26-34. Book No. 8. Compact disk attached to petitioners’ communication of June 24, 2010.