-12that it is the Commission’s application and the State’s answer that determine the purpose of the contentious proceedings before the Court. In view of the above, the State considers that, in this paragraph of the application, the Commission failed to comply with the Rules of Procedure; it therefore requests a ruling from the Court in order to promote better procedural practices by the Commission to ensure the legal certainty of the parties.6 53. It is true that the requests and arguments brief of the representatives, entitled “Application of the representatives of the victims in José del Carmen Álvarez Blanco et al. ‘Pueblo Bello’ v. the Republic of Colombia”, does not have the characteristics of an application and the Court has considered it in those terms. Indeed, in this case, as stipulated by the Convention, the Inter-American Commission is the body empowered to initiate the proceedings before the Court by lodging an application strictu sensu, and not the representatives. The purpose of the requests and arguments brief is to give effect to the procedural attribute of locus standi in judicio recognized to the alleged victims, their next of kin or representatives. 54. In this regard, the Court considers it opportune to reiterate its case law in relation to the participation of the alleged victims, their next of kin or representatives in the proceedings before the Court, and their possibility of alleging facts or the violation of rights that are not included in the application: […] With regard to the facts that are the subject of the proceedings, the Court considers, as it has on other occasions, that it is not admissible to allege new facts distinct from those set out in the application, without detriment to describing facts that explain, clarify or reject those mentioned in the application, or responding to the claims of the applicant. In addition, so-called supervening facts may be submitted to the Court at any moment of the proceedings before judgment is delivered. […] Also, as regards the incorporation of rights, other than those included in the Commission’s application, the Court has established that the petitioners may invoke such rights. They are the possessors of all the rights embodied in the American Convention, and to deny this would be an undue restriction of their condition of subjects of international human rights law. It is understood that the foregoing, regarding other rights, will refer to the facts already included in the application. […] This Court has the competence – based upon the American Convention and grounded in the iura novit curia principle, which is solidly supported in international law – to study the possible violation of Convention provisions that have not been alleged in the pleadings submitted to it, “in the sense that the judge has the authority and even the obligation to apply the pertinent legal provisions in a case, even when the parties do not invoke them expressly,” in the understanding that the parties have had the opportunity to express their respective positions with regard to the relevant facts.7 55. Likewise, in the “Mapiripán Massacre” case, the Court added that: At the current stage of the evolution of the inter-American system for the protection of human rights, the empowerment of the alleged victims, their next of kin or representatives to submit requests, arguments and evidence autonomously must be interpreted in accordance with their situation of titleholders of the rights embodied in the Convention and beneficiaries of the protection offered by the system, without thereby 6 Cf. brief with preliminary objections, answer to the application and with observations on the requests and arguments brief (merits file, tome II, p. 35, folio 392). 7 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre”. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 57; Case of the Moiwana Community. Judgment of July 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, para. 91, and Case of De la Cruz Flores. Judgment of November 18, 2004. Series C No. 115, para. 122.