6 deposited by the authorities investigating the case, the Court notes that it was never restituted, but was lost or stolen while in judicial custody. This assumption is supported by the allegations of the representatives and also by the evidence presented by the State, advising that, on May 8, 1995, a prosecutor’s office ordered that the case file be forwarded to the acting prosecutor because of “indications of a crime against the property (theft) of the Certificate of Judicial Deposit of the National Bank No. […], dated April 18, 1989, for a total of US$7,500.00.” The loss of this sum of money under the State’s custody has a direct causal connection to the events of this case and, consequently, must be restituted. Therefore, if this sum of money has not been returned already, the Court orders that it should be restituted to Pelagia Mélida Contreras-Montoya de Cantoral, who may dispose of it as she sees fit. 22. The Court considered it proved that the sum delivered to Saúl Cantoral Huamaní by the Mining Federation was mislaid or stolen while in the custody of the State; consequently, it should be restituted. Given that Saúl Cantoral Huamaní had this amount in his possession when he was executed, the Court ordered that Pelagia Mélida Contreras Montoya, Mr. Cantoral’s widow, who is a party to these proceedings, and not an entity that is not a party to them such as the Mining Federation, should receive this sum so that she could then “dispose of it as she considered pertinent.” 23. Based on the above, the Court has determined the meaning and scope of the provisions of paragraph 187 of the judgment on preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs in the instant case. VI REGARDING THE STATUS OF ELISA HUAMANÍ INFANZÓN 24. In its application for interpretation, the State advised that, according to its records, “Elisa Huamaní de Cantoral […] is alive; however, according to the judgment of the Court, she is deceased. In this regard, […] the Court is requested to define her actual status, since this aspect of the judgment could be incorrect.” 25. The Inter-American Commission observed that, “as was proved before the Court by pertinent documentary, testimonial and expert evidence, [Elisa Huamaní de Cantoral] died on August 17, 1989; in other words, after her son’s extrajudicial execution and, according to the testimony [given in this case], as a result of the suffering caused by this fact.” The Commission “emphasized that the death certificate that was forwarded was not contested while the case was being litigated before the Court.” Therefore, the Commission concluded that, “since the scope and meaning of the decision in paragraph 185 of the judgment are clear, the requested interpretation is not admissible.” 26. The representatives stated that “no interpretation is in order regarding the status of beneficiary of Elisa Huamaní Infanzón.” They also indicated that they “sent the death certificate of Elisa Huamaní Infanzón to the Court, and it shows that she died on August 17, 1989; that is six months after the death of Saúl Cantoral. This documentation was submitted to the Court by the victims’ representatives as helpful evidence, together with the written arguments presented in a communication dated February 23, 2007. This fact was also mentioned by Ulises Cantoral Huamaní at the public hearing held in the instant case.” Accordingly, they considered that the State’s argument “constituted a questioning of a decision taken by the Court […], and is thus incompatible with the purpose of the application for interpretation of judgment.” 27. Regarding the matter questioned by the State - that the information about the death of the mother of Saúl Cantoral Huamaní could “be erroneous” - the Court