2 4. In my Dissenting Opinion in the Case of Lori Berenson I pointed out that, as stated by the Court, the opinion on whether acts of collaboration exist “should be formed in relation to the definition of the crime of terrorism,” given that the crime, despite being regarded as an autonomous crime under the Peruvian legal system, consists precisely in undertaking activities intended to collaborate with terrorism. This requires an analysis of Article 2 of Decree-Law No. 25.475, which defines terrorism. In paragraph 194 of the judgment, the Court held, in reference to the aforementioned Article 2, that it does not violate Article 9 of the Convention “inasmuch as said statutory definition sets forth the elements of the criminal offense so that it can be distinguished from acts which are either not punishable or punishable with non-criminal sanctions, and does not infringe any other provision of the American Convention.” I disagree with this decision as, in my opinion, the language of Article 2 fails to distinguish the conduct described therein from other crimes that carry a lesser criminal sanction. As a result, Articles 4 and 5 of the aforesaid Decree-Law are also affected. The reasons which explain my position are detailed below. 5. It should be noted that what defines terrorism is, as its name implies, the intent to create terror. If it is not intended to bring terror, the conduct described in the definition may well constitute crimes against persons or property, which carry the respective penalties. Thus, what distinguishes terrorism from other crimes and places it into a different category is its purpose, which makes it a veritable scourge. In order to combat terrorism, many countries, among them Peru, have adopted laws that define this scourge as a specific type or types of crime, carrying heavier penalties and entailing judicial procedures that are more rigorous and much less protective of individual rights, which have often met with criticism for deviating from International Human Rights Law. 6. The nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia principle in Criminal Law, which requires that the punishable conduct be clearly specified, is of paramount importance when dealing with terrorism. This is necessary not only for individuals to know which acts are prohibited in order to avoid prosecution and punishment, but also because it limits the authority of the court to interpret the law in a context in which there is usually strong social condemnation of the alleged offender, which is most likely shared by the court. Around the world, there are well-known examples of the laxity with which the provisions governing different terrorist acts are interpreted and of the restriction imposed on the rights of the accused. This was especially true in the instant case insofar as the first criminal proceedings against Mr. García-Asto and Mr. Ramírez-Rojas were rendered null and void by the State itself due to gross violations of due process of law. However, the statutory definitions of the crimes applied to these cases were not abrogated. 7. Article 2 of Decree-Law No. 24.575 describes the basic crime of terrorism, to which Articles 4 and 5 thereof refer as follows: “any person who causes, creates or maintains a state of intimidation, alarm or fear among the population, or in any segment thereof, commits acts against the life, physical integrity, health, freedom or safety of any person, or against property, the security of public