11 irreparable damage that gave rise to those measures persists,10 based on probative information. 34. That the present measures were ordered owing to the prima facie assessment of a threat to the rights to life and personal integrity of the beneficiaries established in the Order issued on November 27, 2002, taking into account, inter alia, the alleged threatening telephone calls and e-mails – that included several death threats – and other harassment against COFAVIC and Liliana Ortega, which included throwing an object that caused an explosion and a fire near Mrs. Ortega’s residence. 35. That the Court observes that since June 2005 – after the last Order on provisional measures issued by the Court – statements have been made that link the human rights organization to the political opposition and question the way in which they are funded, together with other statements that question the work of COFAVIC and Liliana Ortega as human rights defenders. However, although they may involve different types of harassment, the newspaper articles and the said e-mail do not constitute extreme gravity and urgency to prevent irreparable damage, because they do not constitute a threat, either directly or indirectly, to life and personal integrity. Whereas, the Convention requires the gravity and the situation of danger to be “extreme”; in other words, to the highest or most intense degree. Hence it does not refer to just any danger or threat. 36. That, similarly and as mentioned above, the supposed intimidating effect on the exercise of the defense of human rights is an aspect that must be examined in the context of litigation and not in a procedure for provisional measures; especially when the said statements and newspaper articles do not prove the “urgency” of the protection; in other words, the urgent and immediate need to act to avoid or mitigate damage. 5. Regarding the request to rescind the measures submitted by the State 37. That the State requested that the provisional measures be rescinded, alleging that “currently they lack pertinence and necessity, in view of the inexistence of threats against the beneficiaries and the State’s compliance with the order of the Court.” 38. That the representatives reiterated the need to maintain the provisional measures and specified that, “they have been the only mechanism that has been able, in some way, to ensure the physical security and safety of the members of COFAVIC.” In addition, they presented some observations criticizing the criteria used by the Inter-American Court to determine whether to maintain or rescind the provisional measures in any specific case. The representatives observed that, in its latest Orders, the Court had adopted as the “principal grounds for rescinding [provisional] measures, the passage of “a reasonable period of time” in which no new acts had occurred that could place the beneficiaries at risk. In this regard, they observed that the Court, “instead of verifying a change in the situation that gave rise to the measures, […] ‘considers it reasonable to presume’ that the danger has been overcome based on temporal factors, without taking into account the possibility that it is precisely the provisional measures that have prevented the occurrence of new acts.” Similarly, they considered that, although this factor – time – contributes to assessing the danger, it “should not be the only or the principal factor […] for doing this.” Based on the foregoing, they observed that, “the Court should examine a series of factors that allow it to 10 Cf. Matter of Pueblo Indígena de Kankuamo. Provisional measures with regard to Colombia. Order of the Court of April 3, 2009, seventh considering paragraph.