and as helpful evidence, 153 the Court asked the State to forward the domestic laws on the use of force by police agents at the time of the events and at the present time. In response, the State forwarded legislation post-2006, but not the laws in force at the time of the events, even though the Court repeated its request on several occasions. Consequently, the Court has no proof of the existence of such legislation. 154 126. The Court reiterates that, regarding the use of force, it is essential that the State: (a) has an appropriate legal framework regulating the use of force that ensures the right to life; (b) provides appropriate equipment to the agents responsible for the use of force, and (c) selects and trains these agents properly. In particular, with regard to the obligation to ensure rights, the Court has established that the State has the duty to adapt its domestic laws and “to ensure that its security agencies that are entrusted with the legitimate use of force respect the right to life of those who are subject to the State’s jurisdiction.” 155 The State must establish precise internal policies in relation to the use of force and identify strategies to implement the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and the Code of Conduct. 156 “Thus, it must equip its agents with different types of weapons, ammunition and protective equipment that will allow them to react in a way that is proportionate to the incidents in which they must intervene, limiting the use of lethal weapons that can cause injury or death to the greatest extent possible.” 157 In addition, the State must provide courses for its agents to ensure they know the legal provisions that allow the use of firearms and that they have adequate training so that if they are ever faced with a decision on whether to use them, they have the necessary knowledge to do so. 158 This also applies to intelligence work and, thus, to this case. 159 127. In this regard, in light of Article 2 of the Convention, the Court has indicated that “[t]he general obligation [resulting from this article] entails the adoption of measures of two types. On the one hand, the elimination of norms and practices of any nature that entail the violation of the guarantees established in the Convention and, on the other, 153 Communication of the Secretariat of February 14, 2014 (CDH-12,606/083) and Communication of the Secretariat of May 20, 2014 (CDH-12,606/099) (merits file, folios 951 and 1225, respectively). 154 Furthermore, the CONAREPOL report (supra para. 51) does not reveal the existence of domestic laws concerning the use of force by police agents at the time of the events. The report indicated that, “[a]s regards legislation, the most important efforts relate[d] to the attempts to change the structure of the police transforming it into a “National Police Service” or creating a National Police, a matter that was being debated by the National Assembly even during the diagnosis process. The discussion [was] not new, because already in 1974 the Ministry of the Interior at the time [had] drafted the “Bill on the Organic Law of the National Police”; in 1976, another bill was presented entitled “Organic Law of National Police Services”; in 1987, COPRE presented Congress with an “Organic Law of the Police” and, in 1990, a new bill was presented, “Organic Law of the Federal Police.” At this time, with a new constitutional framework that establishes the creation of a national police force, discussions have still not led to a definitive bill.” It should be noted that, in 2008, the Organic Law of the Police Service and of the Bolivarian National Police Force was approved establishing the progressive and differentiated use of force by the police. 155 Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Retén de Catia), supra, para. 66, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al., supra, para. 80. 156 Cf. Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Retén de Catia), supra, para. 75, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al., supra, para. 80. 157 Case of Nadege Dorzema et al., supra, para. 80, and Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, supra, Principle 2. 158 Cf. Case of El Caracazo v. Venezuela. Reparations and costs. Judgment of August 29, 2002. Series C No. 95, para. 127, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al., supra, para. 81. Cf. European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Case of McCann and Others v. The United Kingdom [GS], No. 18984/91. Judgment of 27 September 1995, para. 151, and Case of Kakoulli v. Turkey, No. 38595/97. Judgment of 22 November 2005, paras. 109 and 110. 159 In the Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala the Court concluded that: “[t]he measures aimed at controlling intelligence work should be particularly strict because, given the confidential conditions in which such activities are carried out, they may result in the perpetration of human rights violations. The intelligence agencies should, inter alia: (a) always respect the fundamental rights of the individual, and (b) be subject to the control of the civilian authorities, including not only the Executive branch, but also other public authorities, as pertinent.” Cf. Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2003. Series C No. 101, para. 284. 32